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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BRUCE P. PALMER

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 880471-CA

BRUCE P. PALMER,

Priority Catagory 2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The defendant, Mr. Palmer, is unable to make a true
statement that would show that the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to consider his appeal of right.

Mr. Palmer

has evidence and believes that jurisdiction of the court
cannot be proved, but that to the contrary, it can be
conclusively proven that the Utah Court of Appeals has no
lawful jurisdiction or power whatever.

A thorough search of

the Oath of Office certificates at the Utah Division of
Archives from 1972 to June 30, 1989 has revealed that all
elected Utah Senate members failed to qualify for public
office following their election from November 1974 to June
1989, a period of fourteen and one half years. On June 30,
1989 there was no evidence in the Utah Division of Archives
to prove that any person elected to the Utah Sentate from
November 1974 to June 30 1989, had ever subscribed and filed
an Oath of Office required by law, since 1974.
-1-

The records show that every act of Utah's "Legislature"
during the last 14 and a half years is unofficial, null and
void.

Utah Code Annotated, 76-8-203;

Utah Constitution,

Art. 4, Sec 10.
The legislation creating the Utah Court of Appeals and
the circuit courts of Utah are void for failure of the
members of the Utah Senate to qualify after being elected in
the 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988
general elections.

A public office automatically becomes

vacant by law when the person elected or appointed fails to
subscribe and file the required oath or bond within 60 days
of the beginning of the term for which he was elected or
appointed.

Utah Code Annotated, 52-2-1; Utah Const. Art.

IV, Sec. 10; 1 Stat 23; U.S. Const. Art. 6.
No elected Senate candidate in Utah has qualified for
public office in fourteen and one half years.

All of the

appointments requiring the advice and consent of the Senate
are necessarily void, including all of the appointments of
all circuit court judges and all appeals court judges, and
all supreme court justices appointed during the last
fourteen and one half years, which includes all members of
the present Supreme Court.

All legislation relating to

those courts made during the last fourteen and one half
years is necessarily void.

Most if not all of the present

court rules are also void.

It is clear that the Utah Court

of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the appeal in
this case or in any other case, past, present or future and

-2-

all former decisions are null and void for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and for lack of judicial power.

This neglect

and unofficial criminal conduct by elected candidates is
detrimental to the security of the people of Utah in the
extreme.
76-8-203;

Utah Const., Art 4, Sec. 10;

Utah Code Annotated,

Utah Code Annotated, 52-1-2 and 52-2-1.

The corresponding official misconduct is equally
detrimental.

Only a person holding public office or

otherwise authorized by law could administer the required
oath of office to a person seeking to qualify for office.
Many oaths of office for elective state office that were
administered during the last fourteen and a half years were
administered by persons not holding public office and who
were not otherwise authorized by law at the time the oaths
were unlawfully administered.

Due process of law is now

virtually nonexistent in Utah and has been for many years.
The certified oaths for Utah Senate candidates cannot be
backdated, subscribed and filed after the sixty day statute
of limitation as were those by and for Norman H. Bangerter,
W. Val Oveson, Tom L. Allen, Edward T. Alter, and R. Paul
Van Dam on April 11, 1989, and I. Daniel Stewart, Michael
D. Zimmerman and Gordon R. Hall, all of whom failed to file
as required by law, until after Mr. Palmer and other persons
revealed the oaths were not on file as of March 20, 1989
for the three unofficial Supreme Court justices, and as of
April 10, 1989, for the five unofficial executive officers,
-3-

and as of April 12, and June 30, 1989 for the unofficial
members of the Utah House and Senate.

It was not until

after the clerk of the Supreme Court was notified that the
oaths of office for Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart and
Michael D. Zimmerman were not on file in the Utah Archives
that they were made, backdated and delivered to the Division
of Archives, well after the sixty day statute of limitation.
52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated;

Utah Const., Art IV, Sec. 10.

Gordon R. Hall was not in office when he administered
an oath to Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson, Tom L. Allen,
Edwart T. Alter, R. Paul Van Dam, I. Daniel Stewart and
Michael D. Zimmerman on January 2, 1989.

He not only failed

to have them subscribe and file their oaths of office, but
he had not filed his own oath of office on January 7, 1987,
and also falsified his own sworn statement and got Geoffrey
Butler to falsify it for him in March of 1989.

Each of the

eight men involved know that their oath certificates are
not true.

They were not subscribed on the date stated nor

were they filed or subscribed within sixty days of the
beginning of their term of office.

They all failed to

qualify and their offices are vacant as a matter of law and
all of their acts are unofficial and are in violation of the
criminal statute 76-8-203, Utah Code Annotated, and deny due
process of law to all people of Utah, not just Mr. Palmer.
Gordon R. Hall's oath of office was not filed timely and
was back-dated more than two full years and delivered to the
-4-

Utah Division of Archives more than 26 months late, and was
signed by Geoffrey Butler, clerk of the Supreme Court who
serves at the pleasure of the Supreme Court justices. This
is a conspiracy of great magnitude in Utah's ever expanding
unofficial State Government,

Corruption keeps spreading.

Because the newly elected Senate members were unofficial
from the time of there respective elections in 1974 to June
30, 1989, the appointments of Christine Durham and Richard
C. Howe were void from the time they were made, as were the
appointments of Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart, and
Michael D. Zimmerman.
are now vacant.

All positions on the Supreme Court

Backdating and falsifying of the oaths of

office certification does not defeat the laws and the
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution and
laws of the United States of America which require the oath
to be taken, subscribed, recorded, certified, and filed
before each duly elected or appointed person enters upon the
duties of the public office to which he or she was elected
or appointed in the State of Utah.
prevail.

Lawlessness will not

Truth and justice will prevail.

The proof is positive and absolute that neither the
circuit courts of Utah, including the trial court, or the
Utah Court of Appeals were ordained by Constitutional law,
and therefore lack of Jurisdiction is total and complete.
Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-3, an unofficial act, is void.
It is repugnant to the Utah and U. S. Constitutions.

-5-

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is an appeal of right which is rightly and
necessarily taken to protect the defendant from the
unlawful, unconstitutional and clearly fraudulent and void
criminal conviction in which the jury was impaneled in a
purported "circuit court" by a purported "judge" who had
personal knowledge in his possession at the time of the
purported trial that it was a federal felony to interfere
with the reception of an interstate transmission of a signal
from an earth satellite space station and who intentionally
withheld that knowledge of the federal felony statute from
the jury in order to falsely convict the defendant for
exercise of a Constitutionally guaranteed, protected and
secured right, with intent to deprive him of that right and
other rights, including his right to do business, by acting
in concert with the purported assistant city prosecutor and
a purported city zoning officer, all three of whom also,
knowingly, intentionally and willfully prosecuted the
defendant on a false Information (to which the defendant had
never entered a plea) in defiance of the United States
Constitution, the laws of the United States of America and
the Constitution and laws of the State of Utah.
The purported judge, assistant prosecutor and zoning
officer (none of whom legally hold office) also deliberately
withheld from the jury knowledge which they had that the
states and the cities had been preempted from enforcing laws
and ordinances which interfere with or prevent satellite
-6-

signal reception and they misled the jury by concealing the
felony statute and federal preemption regulation from the
jury while deliberatly working to convince, persuaded and
direct the jury to convict the defendant when he had not
violated the preempted and void city ordinance, which did
not even apply to Mr, Palmer's nonconforming land, or
nonconforming structures or nonconforming uses, which come
under Salt Lake City Code, 51-8-1 (1986), where not
prohibited by the United States and Utah Constitutions nor
prohibited or preempted by federal law.
All this deception was carried out in a void court
acting under void laws enacted by a void legislature whose
elected members all failed to qualify to hold public office
in 1987 and again in 1989, and whose elected Senators have
all failed to qualify to hold public office for more than
fourteen years, from 1975 to June 30, 1989, and for those
fourteen and a half years not one of their oaths of office
was filed according to law and all of the legislative acts
for the last fourteen and a half years are unofficial and
are absolutely void and neither the circuit court or the
Utah Court of Appeals are lawful courts in the State of
Utah.

The void trial was held in the void Fifth Circuit

Court for Salt Lake City, where Floyd H. Gowans,
impersonating a judge, unlawfully presided at the trial on
the false charges of improper satellite dish placement under
the void Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,

Sections 51-

5-6 and 51-5-7, which first differentiates between satellite
-7-

antennas, allowing them only in required back yards without
allowing other types of Antennas in required back yards, and
denying satellite antennas to persons who have no required
back yards, side yards, or front yards on nonconforming land
which prevents reception on the nonconforming land Mr,
Palmer has, if the ordinance were permitted to be construed
to prohibit reception of satellite signals on nonconforming
land which use cannot possibly conform to the general
provisions of SLC Code Title 51, and 51-5-6 and 51-5-7.

It

is absurd.
Jurisdiction for this appeal is not provided in Section
78-2-3, Utah Code Annotated, because that code provision is
void, it having been enacted by an unofficial legislature
that did not have sufficient oaths of office on file in the
Utah Division of Archives, office of Lieutenant Governor or
office of Secretary of State as required by the Utah Code
Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1 and 76-8-203, before
attempting to enact the legislation purporting to grant
statutory jurisdiction to the unofficial Utah Court of
Appeals.

Utah Const., Art. IV, Section 10; U.S. Const.,

Art. VI; and 1 Stat 23, Section 2, (1789).

-8-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES INCLUDING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
1. Whether the acts purporting to create the circuit
courts of Utah and the Utah Court of appeals and provide for
the appointment and compensation of the judges thereof, and
all other purported acts of the Utah legislature since 1974
are unofficial, null and void?
2.

Whether all the persons who were elected in 1974 to

serve in the Utah Senate and all other persons elected after
1974 to serve in the Utah Senate failed, under provisions of
the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah, to qualify to
hold public office following their election?
3.

Whether a person who is elected to serve in a

public office in the State of Utah is required by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and by the
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah to take and
subscribe and file an oath of office before entering upon
he duties of the office to which that person was elected?
4.

Whether a person is guilty of unofficial misconduct

if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions
of a public office when he has not taken and filed the
required oath of office?
5.

Whether whenever any person duly elected or

appointed to any office of the state or any of its political
subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for
-9-

which he was elected or appointed, such office shall
thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as provided by
law?
6.

Whether whenever any bond of any officer of the

state or any of the politcal subdivisions is cancelled,
revoked, annulled, or otherwise becomes void or of no
effect, without another proper bond being given so that
continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of
such officer shall thereupon become vacant and shall be
filled as provided by law?
7.

Whether the persons elected to serve in the Utah

Senate in the 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and
1988 general elections filed or failed to file the required
oath of office before entering upon the duties of the office
of Senator in the Utah Legislature?
8.

Whether all appointments to public office to which

the advice and consent of the Utah Senate is required are
void because the Utah Senate was unable to act officially
during the years 1975 through 1989 because all of the
persons elected to serve in the senate from 1974 to 1992
have failed to qualify for the office of Senator in the Utah
Senate of the Utah Legislature?
9.

Whether the circuit courts of the State of Utah and

the Utah Court of Appeals are without judicial power and
without any kind of jurisdiction in any case whatever
because the purported legislation creating them is void for
-10-

lack of legislative power in the persons enacting the
controverted legislation which took place between January 1,
1975 and June 30, 1989?
10.

Whether the persons elected to serve in the Utah

House of Representatives in the 1986, and 1988 general
elections filed or failed to file the required oath of
office before entering upon the duties of the office
of Representative in the Utah Legislature?
11.

Whether the persons elected to serve in the offices

of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer and
Attorney General of the State of Utah in the 1984 and 1988
general elections filed or failed to file the required oath
of office before entering upon the duties of the respective
executive offices?
12.

Whether the persons elected to serve in the offices

of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer and
Attorney General of the State of Utah in the 1988 general
election failed to subscribe and file the required oath
of office before entering upon the duties of the respective
executive offices and subscribed the oath and filed it on
April 11, 1989, ninty nine days after the term of office
began, and falsely back-dated the certificates, to make it
appear that they were sworn and subscribed on January 2,
1989, thus making the five executive offices vacant as a
matter of law pursuant to the United States Constitution,
Article VI; 1 Stat 23, Sec 2; Utah Constitution, Art. IV,
-11-

Section 10J Utah Code Annotated, Sections, 52-1-2, 52-2-1,
and 76-8-203?
13.

Whether all the positions on the Utah Supreme Court

are vacant because Gordon R. Hall failed to subscribe and
file the required oath of office within sixty days of the
beginning of the term in January 1987, and back-dated a
fraudulent certificate in March of 1989 and subscribed and
had it place in the Utah Division of Archives after March
20, 1989, and I Daniel Stewart and Michael Zimmerman failed
to file their oath certificates until after the 20th day of
March 1989, and all original appointments to Utahfs Supreme
Court of the persons now acting or attempting to act in
those five positions were defective because the persons
elected to the Utah Senate from 1974 to 1989 all failed to
file the required oath and could not act officially for the
people of the State of Utah?
14. Whether Salt Lake City is preempted by federal law
from regulating location of certain structures, including
satellite receive only antennas, on nonconforming land with
nonconforming structures and nonconforming uses and
requiring an application for a variance and requiring a
public hearing?
15.

Whether Mr. Palmer's land, structures and uses of

his land and structures are conforming or nonconforming
under Salt Lake City Code Title 51?
16.

Whether any of the provisions of Salt Lake City

Code Sections, 51-5-6 and 51-5-7 apply to Mr. Palmers land?
-12-

17.

Whether Mr. Palmer's land, structure and uses are

located at 933 Pennsylvania Place, or 933 East Pennsylvania,
or 933 East Pennsylvania Avenue, or 833 East Pennsylvania
Avenue and at which one of the above locations was the
defendant found guilty of having placed an unauthorized
structure?
18.

Whether 933 East Pennsylvania, 933 East

Pennsylvania Avenue and 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue are
located within or without Salt Lake City, Utah and whether
these represent real or imaginary addresses or locations?
19.

Whether Defendant Palmer's other 150 issues and the

above 18 issues and the issues below are just grounds for
reversal of the unauthorized trial court?
20.

Whether Utah's legislative, executive, and judicial

offices are all vacant as a matter of Constitutional law?
21.

Why does the Utah Constitution require a person,

elected or appointed to an office which is made elective or
appointive by the Utah Constitution or by the laws made in
pursuance of the Constitution, to take and subscribe the
particular oath contained in the Utah Constitution to uphold
the Constitution of the United States before he enters upon
the duties of the office to which he is elected or
appointed, and why does the law of Utah require that the
oath subscribed be filed before acting or attempting to act
in the office to which the person has been elected or
appointed, if the filing of the oath of office is only for
-13-

historical purposes as claimed by Douglas Bischoff and
Jefferey Johnson and those persons who filed after the sixty
day statute of limitation expired, or did not file at all,
some for more than fourteen years?

Do you suppose it is

just an old out-dated formality that no longer applies in
modern Utah political life?
the past?

Is being honest just a thing of

Is Back-dating the documents just a normal

practice, just a normal way to get around or disobey the
requirements of the Constitution and the laws that one has
sworn to obey?

Are County Attorneyfs and their deputies

such as David Yocum and Walter Ellett, elected and appointed
to office just to ignore the criminal violation of the oath
of office provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, when every
elected and appointed state "officialfs" acts are violation
of the Constitution and laws of Utah and of the United
States of America?

If the prosecutors will not prosecute

the Unofficial Misconduct of elected and appointed persons,
who will protect the people from the criminals acting or
attempting to act in public offices they do not lawfully
and constitutionally hold?
22.

Is all truth in government lost?

Are all bonds void for public servants who failed

to subscribe and file their oath within the sixty day
statute of limitation?
23.

Is the State liable for the bond of the State

Treasurer when he filed 99 days late and 39 days after the
sixty day statute of limitation to qualify for office before
the office becomes vacant?
-14-

24.

Are all bonds void for all unofficial appointments

to positions requiring that bonds be filed?
25.

Are all warrants void which are issued by an

unofficial State Treasurer who filed a void oath and has a
void bond?
26.

Is an oath of office which is subscribed and filed

late, void, or is it a falsified public record or both?
27.

Is a back-dated oath false and void, except for

evidence in a criminal prosecution or a civil action against
the person so subscribing, back-dating and filing the false
oath of office certificate?
28.

What is the criminal liability for falsifying a

public record in order to assume a vacant office before it
is discovered to be vacant or even after it is discovered to
be vacant, as was done by the 5 executive and 3 judicial
unofficial officers of the State of Utah in late march and
early april 1989?
29.

What is the criminal liability for the one person

who falisfied all eight documents in March and April 1989,
one for himself and seven for the two other unofficial
justices of the Supreme Court and the five unofficial
executive officers?
30.

Who was the unofficial justice of the Supreme Court

that on January 17, 1987 administered the oath of office to
the seven unofficially appointed judges of the unofficial
Utah Court of Appeals?
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31.

Is it obstruction of justice to conceal a criminal

act from a magistrate?
32.

Is it a citizen's duty to report the crimes of

public servants who fail to lawfully and constitutionally
qualify for office and continue to act as if they had
qualified?
33.

To whom do you report the crime when all of the

magistrates are either unofficial or are all receiving
illegally and unconstitutionally diminished compensation for
not doing their constitutional and lawful duty and who
receive increases in the illegal and unconstitutional
compensation from an unofficial legislature through an
unofficial treasurer from falsified public accounts and
falisified private bank accounts drawn out by unauthorized
warrants of the Utah treasury through First Security Bank?
34.

Is all public bonding in Utah void?

35.

Is all current public debt unauthorized by law?

36.

Is all current unauthorized public debt void?
-16-

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES, TREATIES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES.
United States Constitutional provisions:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN ITS ENTIRETY WHICH IS SET OUT VERBATIM IN
ADDENDUM "A" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL.
The defendant asserts the whole Constitution of the
United States of America in defense of his rights.
He was unduly convicted to involuntary servitude.
Article I-VII; Amendments I-XXVI; Amendments I, VI, XXI.
Utah Constitutional provisions:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN ITS
ENTIRETY WHICH IS SET OUT VERBATIM IN ADDENDUM "B"
OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL.
The defendant asserts the whole Constitution of the
State of Utah in defense of his rights. Many of the
amendments (post 1974) are Unconstitutional and void.
Articles I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI-XXII, XXIII.
United States Statutes:
UNITED STATES STATUTES WHICH ARE SET OUT VERBATIM
IN ADENDUM "C" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON
APPEAL OR IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF.
The defendant asserts all United States statutes
made in pursuance of the United States Constitution
in defense of his rights. Many acts are void.
18 USCA 2-8, 241, 242, 331-334, 371, 1367, 1961-1965
42 USCA 1983-1988; 47 USCA 151, 705; 1 Stat 23, 246
USCA Amend. I, VI, XXI.
Utah State Statutes:
UTAH STATE STATUTES WHICH ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN
ADDENDUM "D" APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL OR
ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF.
The defendant asserts all valid Utah statutes made
in pursuance of the Utah Constitution in defense of
his rights. Many acts are unconstitutional and void.
All post 1974 acts are unconstitutional and void.
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1, 76-8-203.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-3 is void.
-17-

United States Treaties:
The defendant asserts all United States treaties
made under the authority of the United States in
defense of his rights. Many treaties are void.
United Nations Charter:

Human Rights Resolution (1946)

Satellite Treaties:
United States Agency Rules:
UNITED STATES AGENCY RULES ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN
ADDENDUM "F" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL.
The defendant asserts all valid United States
Agency rules in his defense. Many rules are void.
Federal Communication Commission Rules:
47 CFR 25.104

(This rule may be void).

Utah State Court Rules:
The defendant asserts that the new Utah Court rules
are unconstitutional and void, and deny due process,
and effectively deny the defendant his right of appeal.
Salt Lake City Ordinances:
SALT LAKE CITY CODE SET OUT VERBATIM IN ADDENDUM
"E" and "P" OF APPELLANTfS ORIGINAL BRIEF ON
APPEAL OR IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF.
The defendant asserts all Salt Lake City ordinances
made in pursuance of the United States Constitution
and Utahfs Constitution in his defense. Many are Void.
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.010

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.020

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.030

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.040

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.050

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.010

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.020

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.030

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.040

(Addendum "E")

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.050

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.060

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.070

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.010

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.020

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.030

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.040

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.050

(Addendum "E"

Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-5 (1982) (Addendum "E"
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-6 (1982) (Addendum "E"
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-7 (1982) (Addendum "E"
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-6(12) (1986) (Addm."P"
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-7 (1986) (Addendum "P"
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-23 (1986):
All fences, walls, or similar structures shall
be erected entirely within the property lines
of the property they are intended to serve.
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-8-1 (1986):
The lawful use of any building, structure, or
land, existing at the time of the passage of
of this title may be continued, though such use
does not conform with the provisions of this
title, subject to the controls and restrictions
placed thereon elsewhere in this chapter.
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-8-4 (1986) (Addendum "E")
Section 51-8-4 is preempted, unconstitutional and void.
(Ordinance requiring dish antenna user to apply
for a permit and variance and go through a public
hearing before installation of a Satellite receive
only antenna is unconstitutional and void.)
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-34-1(1)(A), (1986):
Request for Variance
Other Authorities:

$50.00 is Void.

See Appellant's Brief page xxxiii.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/appellant Bruce Palmer (Palmer) was charged
without an Information with violating Section 51-5-7 Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City by unlawfully placing an
unlawful structure, a satellite dish antenna, in his front
yard.

The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to

upholding the jury verdict, are as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is not the owner

of the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue.
Plaintifffs Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51).
2.

No such property exists.

Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building

and Housing Division did not receive a complaint concerning
833 East Pennsylvania Avenue (R. 37). At that location, he
did not observe a satellite dish antenna located in the
front yard (R. 38). Spangenberg advised the defendant that
the satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of a
(void) Salt Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987.
43).

(R.

There is no required front yard at that address.
3.

On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a

void Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying
the defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City
Ordinance No. 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish
located on his property before January 4, 1988.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6).

A light pole is not prohibited.
-20-

4.

A void misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt

Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January
6, 1988 (CR 1-2). Ornamental features are not prohibited.
5.

Palmer was not advised of his right not to apply

for a variance on December 31, 1987 (R. 45). Palmer did not
apply for a variance (R. 47). At trail on July 5, 1988, the
void jury found the defendant had not complied with the void
notice and order (R. 52) and was guilty of violating the
void ordinance, Section 51-5-7, Revised Ordinance Salt Lake
City.

The trial was held in a void court.

U.C.A. 76-8-203.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Salt Lake City's regulation of required front yard

structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas,
is unconstitutional and is preempted by federal law because
Salt Lake's regulation does differentiate between satellite
receive only antennas and other types of antennas and the
Salt Lake City ordinance has unreasonable health, safety and
aesthetic objectives that do impose unreasonable limitations
on satellite received signals.
2.

The balance of Palmer's 149 issues including the

trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not
compensated in gold or silver and defendant's fine not being
valid because tender was in void currency rather than gold
or silver coin have substantial merit and are grounds for
reversal of the unconstitutional and unlawful trial court,
and Mr. Palmer reasserts each of his one hundred and fifty
grounds for reversal and expands the issue of jurisdiction.
-21-

3.

The primary issue in this case is jurisdiction.

The key general issues in this case are:

(1) whether all

the persons elected to the Utah House of Representatives
and Utah Senate did take, subscribe and file the required
oath of office in order to qualify to hold the office before
entering in to the duties of the office to which they were
elected for the years 1975 through June 1989 or whether all
Utah legislation and all state appointments made since 1975
are void because the legislature failed to meet United
States and Utah Constitutional and statutory qualifications
to hold public office;

(2) Whether the individuals rights

and the United States Constitution, United States felony
statutes, telecommunications statutes, interstate commerce
statutes, and statutes that guarantee, protect and secure to
persons their individual personal rights, and the Utah
Constitution, preempt the making of state laws and local
ordinances such as Salt Lake City Ordinance, Title 51
including 51-5-6 and 51-5-7 which differentiate between
types of antennas and discriminate against users of
satellite receive only antennas and deprive individuals of
personal rights by attempts at regulating what structures
are permissible on private real property including
regulation of nonconforming land and nonconforming
structures with nonconforming uses under regulatations
designed to regulate conforming land and conforming
structures with conforming uses, even property not having
required back, side and front yards, such as Mr. Palmers,
-22-

and then falsely prosecuting and convicting Mr. Palmer for
committing a "public offence" because his property does not
conform to arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory rules
prescribed for 4000f or more, square foot parcels of land.
What could be more unconscionable, or more absurd or more
unjust, or more unreasonable, than to say a man cannot watch
television because his land does not meet the requisite size
needed to receive permission from the community of free
persons, when the whole reason for organizing a community is
to protect the rights of free persons and to keep those
persons free from unrighteous dominion and corrupt coercion?
The trial court should be reversed and the Salt Lake City,
Code Title 21, formerly title 51, should be held unlawful,
unconstitutional, and void, and all Utah "laws passed" and
"courts created" duing the years 1975 through 1989 are and
must be held unconstitutional and void.

All appointments

to public office of the State of Utah for the years 1975
through 1989 are necessarily void and must be so held.
By law, each public office became vacant for all terms,
1975 through 1989, where the required oath of office was not
subscribed and filed by the person duly elected or appointed
thereto, as required by the Constitutional law of the United
States and by the Constitutional law of the State of Utah,
and as a matter of law the exercise of the functions of the
vacant offices by those failing to file their oaths, was and
is unofficial, criminal and void, denies due process of law,
and confers no power or authority upon any person or thing.
(Details of the argument are now in addendum DD of brief.)
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF DEMANDED
Mr. Palmer was denied due process of law in a void court.
Every provision of the Salt Lake City Code relating to the
regulation of Satellite Antennaes is in conflict with the United
States Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, and the
Constitution of the State of Utah and the laws made in pursuance
thereof including Title 21 formerly Title 51, and particularly
Sections 51-5-5, 51-5-6, and 51-5-7 of Title 51 of the former
Salt Lake City Ordinance was and is preempted by federal law and
47 CFR regulation.

It unequally regulates all types of antennas.

The ordinance does clearly discriminate between antennaes and
creates unreasonable limitations on satellite users. Therefore,
federal preemption is in full force.

The remainder of Palmer's

issues are not oblivious to the record and do merit consideration
by this Court.

The jury verdict finding the defendant guilty is

void under the Constitution of the United States, United States
law and the Utah Constitution and Utah law for lack of lawful
jurisdiction, and due to federal preemption of Salt Lake City's
zoning ordinance and other Salt Lake City regulation of Satellite
Antennaes.

Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is void as

a matter of law, and because of the failure of persons elected to
the Senate of the Utah Legislature to subscribe and file the
required oath of office prior to acting in the office of Senator
of Utah between December 31, 1974 to June 30, 1989, all Utah
legislation during that period of time is unconstitutional and
void, and all appointments requiring the advice and consent of
the Utah Senate were and are also unconstitutional and void.
-46
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THEREFORE, the circuit court system and the Utah Court of Appeals
which the unofficial and unconstitutional legislature attempted
to create, failed as a matter of law, and the appointments of all
judges to the circuit courts, district courts, Utah Court of
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court and other courts during that
fourteen and one half year period of time are void, and all such
offices are vacant as a matter of law, the persons having never
been duly appointed because of the failure of the persons elected
to become Senators to lawfully qualify themselves for office.
As a result of the 1987 and 1989 legislators all failing to
subscribe and file the required oaths of office, the entire
legislature is vacant and also the five executive offices and
three of the five offices on the supreme court are vacant for
failure of those elected to timely file for office, and the five
members of the supreme court also failed to qualify for office
because their original appointments were unofficial and void.
Mr. Palmer also includes by reference the relief demanded in
his original Appellant's Brief on Appeal and reasserts here every
position taken by him in that brief and in this reply brief also.

DATED this 28th day of August, 1989, A.D.

BRUCE P. PALMER
Defendant
Attorney Pro Se

-4?
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I hand delivered or mailed ONE copy
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, Bruce P. Palmer, pro
se, 933 Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, to Roger
F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Attorney, at 451 South 200 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111.

This 28th day of August, 1989, A.D.
I certify that Mr. Richard G. Hamp told me that one copy of
the resubmitted reply brief would be sufficient for his office.

BRUCE P. PALMER

APPENDIX

ADDENDUM "AA

696 F E D E R A L
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and the a s b e s t o s N E S H A P regulations.
Defendants have also failed to comply with
the compliance orders issued to them by
EPA. The Government has established a
reasonable probability of success on the
merits, the likelihood of irreparable injury
if the a s b e s t o s in the hotel is not properly
disposed of, and that a balancing of hardships favors granting an injunction. Because it is so clearly in the public interest
to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants to secure the facility, properly
dispose of the ACM, and comply with
EPA's orders, the Government's motion is
granted.
SZ\

Kelly I. V A N M E T E R and Lauren J.
V a n Meter, Plaintiffo.
v.
TOWNSHIP OF
MAPLEWOOD, Defendant
Civ. A. N o . 87-4677.
United S t a t e s District Court,
D. N e w Jersey.

SUPPLEMENT
economy; in certain limited circumstances,
federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction w h e r e state proceeding
involving the s a m e dispute is pending.
2. Federal Courta <s=»56
Younger
abstention did not apply to
federal civil rights s u i t challenging local
zoning ordinance r e g u l a t i n g television antennas w h e r e municipality had agreed to
stay prosecution of its municipal court complaint for zoning violations until resolution
of s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t motion in federal
court.
3. Federal Courta «=»41
Younger
abstention did not apply to
any administrative r e m e d y which might
have been available to federal court plaintiffs where no proceeding w a s pending before any administrative body.
4. Federal C o u r t s <*=>56
Pullman
abstention w a s not applicable
in federal civil rights suit brought by homeowners challenging ordinance regulating
television a n t e n n a s w h e r e the ordinance
was clear and unmistakable on its face.
5. Civil R i g h U «=»13.9
Exhaustion of s t a t e
administrative
remedies is not required before initiating
federal civil rights action.
42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.

Oct. 13, 1988.

H o m e o w n e r s brought action challenging ordinance which limited type of satellite
dish antenna which they could install on
their land. The District Court, Debevoise,
J., held that: (1) abstention was not required, and (2) ordinance reasonably restricted reception of authorized satellite
signals, and thus w a s preempted by Federal Communications Commission order regulating satellite dish antenna reception.
J u d g m e n t for plaintiffs.

I. Federal Courts <*=»41
Abstention, in its various manifestations, is a prudential doctrine applied to
further comity, federalism, and judicial

6. Civil R i g h t s «=>13.4(1)
Congressional legalization of reception
of authorized satellite television signals
permitted h o m e o w n e r s to bring federal civil rights action a g a i n s t township w h o s e zoning ordinance allegedly interfered with federal regulation of satellite television signal
reception. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Communications Act of 1934, § 705<af b), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605<a, b).
7. Administrative L a w and
Procedure
<S=»229
Exhaustion of remedies is inappropriate where administrative proceedings available to the plaintiffs are not adequate
forms for their federal claims and will not
materially advance resolution of federal
claims.

VAN M E T E R r . ^ 3 W N S H I P O F

MAPLEWOOD

CU«m«696 F-Supp. 1Q24 (D.N-1. 19**)

8. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L a w a n d
Procedure
<s=>229
E x h a u s t i o n d o c t r i n e is i n a p p r o p r i a t e
w h e r e f e d e r a l plaintiff faces s t a t e criminal
p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r s t a t e s t a t u t e which he
c h a l l e n g e s a s r a c i a l l y invalid a n d w h e r e
s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d y is w i t h o u t compet e n c e t o r e s o l v e t h a t claim.
9. M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s <s=»53
S t a t e s <S=»18.9
Federal regulation may preempt state
o r local l a w if t h e a g e n c y i n t e n d e d to exerc i s e e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y in t h e a r e a and t h e
a g e n c y is legally a u t h o r i z e d to displace
s t a t e o r local r e g u l a t i o n .
10. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L a w a n d P r o c e d u r e
<3=»701
T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s <3=>449.20
F e d e r a l district court lacked subject
m a t t e r jurisdiction to consider whether
F e d e r a l C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n exc e e d e d its a u t h o r i t y in i s s u i n g r e g u l a t i o n
p r e e m p t i n g s t a t e o r local z o n i n g with res p e c t t o s a t e l l i t e television a n t e n n a s . Comm u n i c a t i o n s A c t of 1934, § 405, a s a m e n d e d , 4 7 U.S.C.A. § 4 0 5 .
11. Z o n i n g a n d P l a n n i n g «=»14
O r d i n a n c e l i m i t i n g size a n d location of
s a t e l l i t e dish a n t e n n a s w a s a n a t t e m p t to
d i m i n i s h visual i m p a c t of a n t e n n a s a n d
t h u s h a d clearly d e f i n e d h e a l t h , s a f e t y , or
a e s t h e t i c objective for p u r p o s e s of F C C
o r d e r a l l o w i n g c e r t a i n t y p e s of s t a t e a n d
local r e g u l a t i o n of t h o s e a n t e n n a s .
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s a v e o r d i n a n c e , which placed an u n r e a s o n able r e s t r i c t i o n on single reception, f r o m
p r e e m p t i o n by F e d e r a l C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
Commission o r d e r .

S c h e n c k , Price, Smith & K i n g by W .
J a m e s MacNaughton, Morristown, N J . , for
plaintiffs.
S c a r p o n e & Edelson, P.A. by I r w i n P .
B u r z y n s k i , Michael Edelson, Val M a n d e l ,
N e w a r k , N J . , for d e f e n d a n t .
OPINION
D E B E V O I S E , District J u d g e .
This c a s e involves h o m e o w n e r s w h o installed an a n t e n n a to receive satellite t e l e vision s i g n a l s in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of a local
zoning ordinance.
Plaintiff h o m e o w n e r s
claim t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e is invalidated b y
federal law. T h e y seek s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t on t h e i r claims for d e c l a r a t o r y a n d
injunctive relief a n d a t t o r n e y ' s fees.
Def e n d a n t municipality c r o s s - m o v e s for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims a n d to a m e n d i t s
a n s w e r to a s s e r t a d e f e n s e of failure t o
exhaust administrative remedies.
Background

12. Z o n i n g and P l a n n i n g *=»I4
O r d i n a n c e l i m i t i n g s a t e l l i t e dish a n t e n n a s t o six feet in d i a m e t e r a n d t o placem e n t o n t h e g r o u n d with p r o p e r s c r e e n i n g
u n r e a s o n a b l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h reception in
a r e a in which ten-foot d i s h e s w e r e r e q u i r e d
f o r a d e q u a t e r e c e p t i o n and in which antenn a s n e e d e d a n e l e v a t i o n a l i g n m e n t of 14
d e g r e e s a b o v e t h e horizon, a n d t h u s w a s
p r e e m p t e d by F C C o r d e r .

Plaintiffs Kelly Van M e t e r and his w i f e
L a u r e n a r e r e s i d e n t s of M a p l e w o o d , a
small, s u b u r b a n c o m m u n i t y in n o r t h e r n
N e w J e r s e y . In l a t e 1985, plaintiffs decided to p u r c h a s e a satellite television receiveonly a n t e n n a , k n o w n a s a " T V R O " o r
" e a r t h station*', t h a t would e n a b l e t h e m t o
receive television s i g n a l s t r a n s m i t t e d directly from s a t e l l i t e s a n d view t h e m o n a
television monitor. A f t e r r e s e a r c h i n g t h e
t e c h n o l o g y and c o n s u l t i n g with a v e n d o r ,
plaintiffs p u r c h a s e d a T V R O "dish a n t e n n a " , also k n o w n a s a " p a r a b o l i c a n t e n n a "
b e c a u s e of its s h a l l o w dish s h a p e , a t a c o s t
of 52500 installed. The plaintiffs' dish a n t e n n a is ten feet in d i a m e t e r a n d c o m p o s e d
p r i m a r i l y of black anodized w i r e m e s h .

1 3 . Z o n i n g a n d P l a n n i n g <£=»14
O r d i n a n c e u n d e r which s a t e l l i t e dish
a n t e n n a u s e r s w h o could n o t a c h i e v e reception w i t h i n c o n s t r a i n t s i m p o s e d by ordin a n c e could a p p l y for z o n i n g v a r i a n c e
w o u l d not be satisfactory and would not

In D e c e m b e r of 1987, plaintiffs' a n t e n n a
v e n d o r p e r f o r m e d a site s u r v e y of the V a n
M e t e r p r o p e r t y in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e t h e
o p t i m a l site for t h e p l a c e m e n t of t h e d i s h
a n t e n n a . T h e r e s u l t s of t h e s u r v e y indic a t e d t h a t , g i v e n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
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plaintiffs' lot, the antenna would have to be
mounted on the roof to enable plaintiffs to
receive signals from all of the available
satellite television channels.
At the time o f their purchase, plaintiffs
were aware of a zoning ordinance enacted
by the Maplewood Township Committee
(the "Committee") that governed the installation of dish a n t e n n a s . The "Maplewood
Dish Antennae Zoning Ordinance" (the
"Ordinance") b e c a m e effective June 6,
1985. A m o n g its provisions, the Ordinance
forbids the u s e of a dish antenna greater
than six feet in height "measured at the
highest point of its outer circumference or
extension," requires that the dish be placed
in the rear yard, establishes minimum setbacks from property lines and buildings
and requires t h a t the dish be "screened
from view . . . b y e v e r g r e e n planting which
shall be at l e a s t six feet in height at the
time of planting." (A complete copy of the
Ordinance is s e t o u t in the Appendix to this
Opinion).
On May 24, 1986, plaintiffs wrote the
township construction official seeking a
variance from t h e Ordinance to allow them
to place the a n t e n n a on their g a r a g e roof.
The construction official, Robert Mittermaier. wrote the Van Meters on April 1, 1986,
and informed t h e m that the placement they
proposed w a s "not acceptable" and denied
their "application for permission" to erect a
dish antenna.
Plaintiffs attempted to appeal Mittermaier's decision to the township's Board of
Zoning A d j u s t m e n t (the "Board"). They
allege that a l t h o u g h they complied with the
procedures for appeal as explained by Mittermaier, he rejected the application because notice of publication w a s not timely
served on the municipality. According to
plaintiffs, Mittermaier, and later the mayor
of the township, informed the plaintiffs
that an appeal t o the Board would be futile.
Defendant d i s p u t e s these allegations.
After learning; of an order of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") that
plaintiffs believed permitted the installation of their antenna without regard to the
local Ordinance, plaintiffs installed the antenna on the roof of their house. On May
AA-3

SUPPLEMENT
5, 1987,
violation
dered to
on May
pending.

plaintiffs received a s u m m o n s for
of t h e Ordinance and were orappear before the municipal court
19, 1987. T h a t s u m m o n s is still

On N o v e m b e r 11, 1987, plaintiffs filed
this action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claiming that the Ordinance is preempted by
FCC regulation and t h a t it violates their
First A m e n d m e n t rights to receive satellite
television s i g n a l s . T h e y seek injunctive
and declaratory relief and ask for attorney's f e e s pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988.
Abstention
[11 A l t h o u g h not raised directly as a
bar to this action by defendant, I must first
address the i s s u e of abstention. Abstention, in its various manifestations, is a prudential doctrine applied to further comity,
federalism and judicial economy. In certain limited c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a federal court
should abstain from e x e r c i s i n g its jurisdiction w h e r e a s t a t e proceeding involving the
same dispute is pending, Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d
669 (1971); Williams
v. Red Bank Bo. of
Educ., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.1981), where
allowing a s t a t e court to construe its challenged s t a t u t e could avoid the necessity of
reaching any constitutional issue,
Railroad
Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman
Co., 312
U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643. 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941),
or where the i s s u e involves a complex, comprehensive body of s t a t e regulation over an
area of traditionally local interest, Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.CL 1098,
87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). A l t h o u g h abstention
reflects sensitivity to s t a t e sovereignty, its
application is not the result of mere deference but reflects an accommodation between s t a t e and federal interests.
[2] The doctrine first announced in
Younger, supra* p r e v e n t s a federal court
from hearing a case involving strong and
compelling state interests where a proceeding between the s a m e parties and involving
the s a m e i s s u e s is pending in the state
courts. In t h e p r e s e n t case, a summons
w a s issued to the plaintiffs for violation of
the Ordinance on May 7, 1986.
While
Younger principles m i g h t arguably require
abstention in this instance, here defendant
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s t a t e s that "Maplewood . . . has agreed to
s t a y the prosecution of its Municipal Court
complaint against Van Meter until after
p l a i n t i f f s motion for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is
decided." B e c a u s e defendant has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of this
court, therefore, the values underlying
Younger are not implicated and its prudential constraints do not apply. Ohio
Civil
Rights
Comm'n
v. Dayton
Christian
Schools, Inc., All U.S. 619, 626, 106 S.CL
2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986);
Broum
v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees
and
Bartenders
Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S.
491, 500 n. 9, 104 S . C t 3179, 3184 n. 9, 82
L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Ohio Bureau
of Employment
Services
v. Hodory,
431 U.S.
471, 480, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1904, 52 L.Ed.2d
513 (1977).
[ 3 ] Nor does Younger abstention apply
to any administrative remedy which may
h a v e been available to plaintiffs through
the township's Board of Adjustment bec a u s e no proceeding is pending before that
body. Plaintiffs twice attempted to obtain
a variance from the Board. Their first
letter, requesting a "zoning variance hearing a t the next town meeting," w a s treated
a s an "application for permission" to erect
a dish antenna and "denied" by the township construction official who also informed
plaintiffs of their right to appeal his decision to the Board. Plaintiff discussed the
notice requirements for a hearing application before the Board with the construction
official and then completed and filed an
"Application for Hearing" and had a public
notice of an appeal for a variance printed in
the local newspaper. According to plaintiffs' certification, however, the construction official refused to accept the application because he claimed not to have received proof of publication in sufficient
time.
Defendant does not claim that a
variance application is now pending and it
is clear that the unappealed decision of a
municipal administrative official is not a
pending proceeding within the meaning of
the Younger
doctrine.
[41 Pullman
abstention requires a federal court to abstain when difficult and
unsettled questions of state law m u s t be

resolved before a federal question can be
decided. The "relevant inquiry" under the
Pullman
doctrine, as the Supreme Court
observed in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237, 104 S . C t 2321, 2327,
81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) "is not whether there
is a bare, though unlikely, poasibility that
s t a t e courts m i g h t render adjudication of
the federal question unnecessary." Rather, the question \& w h e t h e r the s t a t u e is of
an uncertain nature and " 'obviously susceptible of a limiting construction/ " Id.,
quoting
Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
251 and n. 14, 88 S.CL 391, 397 and n. 14,
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). Pullman
abstention is inappropriate here. The language
of the Ordinance is clear and unmistakable^
on its face and no difficult area of state
law is presented for interpretation. Moreover, Pullman
abstention is inappropriate
in c a s e s involving a claim of preemption.
Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith,
637 F.2d 181,
185 (3d Cir.1980).
Exhaustion

of Administrative

Remedies

I m u s t next a d d r e s s defendant's claim
that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
15, 6 J Exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required before initiating an action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
Patsy v. Florida
Bo, of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).
A section 1983 action may be brought for
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution
and l a w s " of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
sec. 1983. C o n g r e s s legalized the reception
of authorized or unencrypted satellite television signals under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act"),
as discussed at g r e a t e r length below, and
the FCC, in turn, issued the Order to minimize interference with satellite television
reception. This permits plaintiffs to bring
a Section 1983 action for interference with
this federal s c h e m e . Maine v.
Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 100 S . C t 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555
(1980); see also, e.g., Kennecott
Corp., supra, 637 F.2d at 186 n. 5 (section 1983
action may be b r o u g h t for federal statu-
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tive body is without competence to resolve
the claim. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 497 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 n. 5,
52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plaintiff facing quasi-criminal proceeding for violation of local
zoning ordinance not required to seek zoning variance).
Since I conclude that plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust administrative remedies, defendant's motion to amend ita answer to assert this affirmative defense is
denied as futile.
The FCC Order
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Act")
[7] Exhaustion of administrative reme- amending the Communications Act of 1934.
dies is further inappropriate in this in- The main thrust of this legislation is to
stance because the administrative proceed- assure that the exploding market for cable
ings available to plaintiffs are not adequate television technology provides the widest
forums for their federal claims and would possible diversity of information services to
not materially advance the resolution of
the public. See House Committee on Enerthis controversy. See, e.g.. Republic In- gy and Commerce, Cable Communications
dus., Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania
Team- Policy Act of 1984, H.R.Rep. No. 89-934,
sters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295 (3d 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 19, reprinted in part
Cir. 1982); Cerro Metal Prods, v. Marshall, in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. <fe Admin.News
620 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980). The 4655, 4656. Recognizing that cable suppliBoard's functions are narrowly limited to ers often rely on encrypted satellite transtechnical matters involving review of deci- mission feeds which they then distribute
sions of administrative officers of the through the cable distribution network to
Board, interpretations of zoning maps and home viewers, the Act also provided for
ordinances and the granting of variances. stiffened penalties for unauthorized satelSee NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D-70. Its proceed- lite video users who intercept and decode
ings are not bound by the rules of evi- these "pirated" messages for private use.
dence. NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D-10(e). Ap- See 47 U.S.C. 605<a). This provision also
peals from a Board decision may be taken contains a limited exception to liability for
to the municipality's governing body, in direct reception of unencrypted and authothis case the township committee, only "if
rized reception of encrypted satellite telepermitted by [township] ordinance." N.J. vision transmissions. Ia\ at sec. 605(b).
S.A. sec. 40:55D-17(a). Even then, appeals Congress apparently believed that unreare limited to the Board's decisions on spe- stricted market forces embodied in the purcial use variances. la\; Nickerson v. New- chasing decisions made by individual conark, 220 NJ.Super. 284, 531 A.2d 1095 sumers would be the best means of deter(L.Div.1987). To require exhaustion of an
mining the viability of this information disadministrative process that is without com- tribution technology. See 120 Cong.Rec.
petence to consider plaintiffs claims would S14,286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
merely delay the ultimate resolution of this Packwood) reprinted
in 1984 U.S.Code
dispute.
Cong. & Admin.News, 4742, 4747.
[8] Finally, invocation of the exhaustion
Relying in part on the Cable Act's sateldoctrine is also inappropriate where a fed- lite television provisions, see 51 Fed.Reg.
eral plaintiff faces state criminal prosecu- 5519, 5522 (1986), the FCC issued an Order
tion under a statute he challenges as facial- entitled "Preemption of local zoning of
ly invalid and where the state administra- earth stations," found at 47 C.F.R. sec.
tory rights protected by Williams Act);
Pietroniro v. Oceanport, 764 F.2d 976, 980
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106
S.Ct 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985) ("In the
absence of a comprehensive enforcement
scheme within the regulatory scheme
which encompasses plaintiffs' complaint,"
there is a private cause of action through
section 1983 to redress state's failure to
provide housing relocation assistance under
Housing Act of 1949 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970). Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is therefore not a
bar to this action.
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25.104. The Order provides, in relevant
part, that:
State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate between satellite
receive-only antennas and other types of
antenna facilities are preempted unless
such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception
of satellite delivered signals by receiveonly antennas or to impose costs on the
users of such antennas that are excessive in light of the purchase and installation cost of the equipment.
47 C.F.R. sec. 25.104.
Plaintiffs
assert
that
this
Order
preempts the Maplewood Ordinance.
Preemption
of the
Ordinance
[9] A federal regulation may preempt
state or local law if (1) the agency intended
to exercise exclusive authority in the area
and (2) if the agency is legally authorized
to displace state or local regulation. New
York v. FCC,
U.S.
,
,
108 S.Ct, 1637, 1641-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 48
(1988). The intent of the FCC is clear on
the face of the Order which explicitly provides that local regulation inconsistent with
its requirements is preempted.
[101 The second step of the New York
test and defendant's assertion that the FCC
exceeded its authority present identical inquiries. This court, however, lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the question.
Before an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must have been given
the opportunity to reconsider its position.
47 U.S.C. sec. 405; Peoria v. General Elec.
CabUvision Corp. 690 F.2d 116, 121 (7th
Cir.1982). Although 47 U.S.C. sec. 405
specifies that a petition for reconsideration
must be filed within thirty days of the
Commission's decision, this provision has
been interpreted merely to provide the
Commission with a "fair opportunity" to
1.

I note in passing that the Supreme Court recently sustained the FCCs authority to issue
regulations preempting local cable regulation
enacted in the wake of the Cable Act's passage.
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consider the issues. Meredith Corp. v.
FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C.Cir.1987); Peoria,
supra, 690 F.2d at 119. Thus defendant
may raise his arguments before the commission in a motion for a declaratory judgment, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.2, or in a petition for
repeal of the Order, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.401.
Judicial review may only then be sought
from the Court of Appeals. 47 U.S.C.
405(a); 28 U.S.C. sec. 2342(1). In the interests of judicial economy, I will assume
without deciding that the Order was a valid
exercise of authority by the Commission
and proceed on to the balance of the preemption analysis. 1

The preemption issue presented here is
unusual because the federal regulation itself establishes standards that govern
whether and to what degree the local regulation is preempted.
The threshold determination under the
Order is whether the challenged regulation
differentiates between TVRO's and other
types of antenna facilities. The Ordinance
clearly applies to "dish antennae . . . or
satellite receiving stationfs]." Ordinance
sec. 2.1. It differentiates between TVRO
antennas and transmitting dish antennas
by forbidding the use of the latter entirely.
Id. at sec. 2.3. The Ordinance does not
apply to UHF and V H F television, FM radio, or ham and short-wave radio antennas.
Thus the Ordinance effectively discriminates between different types of antennas.
[11] The Order next provides that in
order to avoid preemption, the local regulation must have a reasonable, clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective.
The Ordinance passes this test. Satellite
dish antennas are large and rather unsightly. Although it does not state its purposes
explicitly, the Ordinance is clearly an attempt to diminish the visual impact of the
antennas by requiring that they be installed in the rear yard and, where they can be
viewed from the street or adjoining properties, requiring that the installation be
screened with tail shrubbery. Some safety
Sew York v. FCC,
U.S.
. 10S S.CL 1637.
100 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988). The Court did not directly consider the FCC Order in question, however.
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purposes might also be achieved by preventing dish antenna roof placement and
by establishing height limitations in order
to avoid the hazards of a fallen or windblown antenna.
Finally, the Ordinance also must not prevent or impose unreasonable limitations on
reception or impose costs on the user disproportionate to his total investment in antenna equipment and installation. In order
to make this evaluation I must first digress
to consider how satellite television signals
are received I draw this explanation from
the undisputed affidavit submitted by
plaintiffs' TVRO vendor and installer, the
article submitted by defendant, Harry B
Roth, Regulating Satellite Dish Antennas,
American Planning Association, Planning
Advisory Service Report No 394, and the
discussion accompanying the release of the
FCC Order at 51 Fed Reg. 5519 (1986) et
seq
Nineteen satellites in geostationary orbit
22,300 miles above the equator broadcast
programming services that can be received
only by TVRO antennas These ''television
satellites" are located above the eastern
Pacific and are spaced four degrees apart
from each other The TVRO remains in a
fixed position to receive signals from a
given satellite but is mounted on an electric
rotor that permits it to be realigned to
receive signals from the other satellites as
required
In order for the TVRO antenna to receive satellite signals, there must be a clear
line of sight between the satellite and the
dish antenna. Dense obstructions such as
buildings, trees and shrubbery interfere
with or prohibit reception The range of
unobstructed positions an antenna must
have to "view" the satellites and receive
signals is called a deception window ' or
"look angle ' This angle is expressed in
terms of two dimensions
The azimuth
alignment, expressed in degrees from true
North, refers to the horizontal direction the
antenna must be directed Since there are
a number of television satellites, this is
expressed as a range The elevation alignment refers to the vertical orientation,
usually expressed in degrees above the ho-

rizon. In northern New Jersey, a look
angle with an azimuth alignment of 69 to
143 degrees West and an elevation alignment of 14 degrees above the horizon is
required to receive signals from the television satellites.
Because satellite-transmitted television
signals are relatively weak, the dish antennas must be at least ten feet in length in
this area of the country in order to receive
transmissions.
[12] Plaintiffs do not claim that a rearlot installation would completely preclude
all satellite reception; they claim, rather,
that they can receive "all" of the available
signals only by mounting the dish antenna
on the roof of their house. The FCC Order
does not require the Ordinance to permit
optimal placement, it precludes only "unreasonable" interference with satellite signal reception It is unclear whether plaintiffs inability to receive "all" of the satellite signals includes channels which are encrypted or which the plaintiffs are not otherwise authorized to receive. Construing
all facts m the light moat favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment, I cannot conclude, on the basis of this assertion
alone, that the regulation imposes an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs.
It is clear, however, that the Ordinance
functions as an unreasonable burden on
reception because its provisions make reception technically impossible and because
it is generally insensitive to the unique
conditions that govern signal reception on
any given site
Although defendant does not dispute
that a ten foot wide dish antenna is the
smallest size capable of receiving television
satellite reception in this area, the Ordinance makes reception technically impossible by limiting the maximum height of any
part of the antenna installation to six feet.
A ten-foot wide dish antenna angled at the
required fourteen degree elevation, would
clearly exceed this limitation.
The Ordinance is also insensitive to the
unique conditions that govern reception on
any given lot. The Ordinance requires the
antenna to be "screened from view from
adjoining properties and streets by ever-
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green planting
at least six feet in cedes to be an unreasonable limitation of
height at the time of planting " Ordinance reception, is to allow TVRO users who cansec, 3 1. This standard is unreasonable not achieve reception within the constraints
because it is insensitive to the impact of
imposed by the Ordinance to apply to the
shielding on an antenna's reception win- Board of Adjustment for a zoning variance.
dow. While vegetation surrounding a sat
(This would presumably also be its reellite installation can actually help improve sponse to the other unreasonable limitareception by absorbing interfering signals, tions I have found the statute imposes
it can impair or limit reception if it ob- upon reception) The defendant claims that
structs the antenna's line of sight. If the this scheme would effectively enable the
orientation of a specific lot requires a look
Board to apply the Ordinance in an individangle directed toward a rear-adjoining lot, ualized manner
for example, the antenna would have to be
This scheme is unsatisfactory for several
placed over ten feet behind the required reasons First, while the concept of mdi-"
six-foot high evergreen screening, assum- viduahzed treatment may be a worthy one,
ing a fourteen degree elevation azimuth, in variances from this Ordinance do not proorder to gain a clear 'View" over the obvide an effective means of achieving this
stacle. Given the configuration of some
objective A variance from a zoning ordilots, this might well limit or completely
nance is permitted only if "without subprevent reception This type of regulation
stantial detriment to the public good" and
was specifically disapproved by the FCC in
if it "will not substantially impair the inthe statements accompanying its Order
tent and the purpose of the zone plan and
51 Fed Reg 5519, 5524 (1986) ("[An ordizoning ordinance " N J S A sec. 40 55Dnance] cannot unreasonably limit or pre70 Apart from the very real question of
vent reception by requiring, for example,
whether any variance from the challenged
that a receive-only antenna be screened so
Ordinance would remain consistent with its
that line of sight is obscured ")
specific purposes, this scheme is objectionaIn addition, if there were lots on either ble because it does not include reasonable
side of the rear yard, the TVRO user would
satellite television signal reception as a
also have to shield the antenna from view
factor m the evaluation but considers only
by the adjoining properties by planting the purposes of the ordinance and the
evergreen shielding on both sides Thus, a "public good"
homeowner might have to plant thirty feet
Second, permitting the Board effect-vely
of hedgerows six feet tall to comply with
to
regulate TVRO antenna placement by
the ordinance at a cost that could easily
granting
variances from an invalidated orexceed the initial investment in satellite
dinance
would
allow the Board to exercise
television reception equipment
authority without bounds
No standards
The Ordinance also unreasonably re- for antenna placement would exist to guide
stricts reception by failing to provide op- the decisions of the Board, to apprise
tions for alternative placement to TVRO TVRO users of permitted placement sites,
users who cannot receive signals or who or to provide a meaningful standard for
would receive only diminished reception
review of the Board's decisions Nor could
through rear lot installation While roof
the Board be guided directly by the FCC
mounting poses obvious aesthetic and safe- Order since it was intended as a standard
ty problems, a per se prohibition of roof
for the preemption of local regulation not
installations, especially where the commu- a model zoning ordinance Permitting the
nity interests in appearance and safety can
Board to regulate TVRO use in this manbe satisfied at least in part, is an unreason- ner would also increase the likelihood of
able limitation on reception within the judicial intervention in a traditionally local
meaning of the Order
function, something that I would think that
(131 Defendant's proposed solution to the defendant would be loathe to encourage
the antenna height limitation, which it con

1032

696 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

Finally, the variance procedure, requir
motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 should be
mg TVRO antenna users to make an appli- dismissed as moot.
cation for hearing, publish notice, serve
However, defendant challenges the validnotice of publication and make a presenta- ity of the FCC Order, an issue I do not
tion at a public meeting, imposes burdens have jurisdiction to decide. If within 45
other antenna users are not required to days of October 11, 1988 defendant combear and is therefore discriminatory within mences a proceeding challenging the Order
the meaning of the Order Since the pro- before the FCC and thereafter actively
cess is not governed by consistent, objec- prosecutes the proceeding, and if defendant
tive standards, this variance process would stays prosecution of plaintiffs and enforcerepresent an unreasonable limitation on re- ment of the Ordinance against them, I shall
ception
defer entering summary judgment against
I am not unsympathetic to the difficult defendant at this time and shall stay protask faced by municipalities that seek to ceedings in this case until final disposition
regelate dish antenna use in balancing the of the proceeding challenging the validity
community's aesthetic and safety interests of the FCC Order Otherwise summary
with the individual's interest in receiving judgment will be entered as described
information transmitted through satellite above
Defendant should advise me by
television signals The FCC, however, has October 31, 1988 what course of action it
determined that when the community and proposes to take.
individual interests conflict in this context,
APPENDIX
the interests of the individual and the national interest require that the balance be
MAPLEWOOD DISH ANTENNAE
tipped in favor of permitting individual satZONING ORDINANCE
ellite television reception
The task of
r
There
is
hereby
adopted an ordinance reguonioning appropriate legislation in light
lating
the
construction,
placement, and use
of this mandate is not a simple one, but
municipalities can enact regulation consist- of dish antennae within the Township of
Maplewood and supplementing and amendent with the Order by regulating the use of
all antennas evenhandedly, without impos- ing the zoning ordinance of the Township
ing special burdens on TVRO dish antenna of Maplewood regarding Accessory Buildusers, or by ensuring that their regulations ing and Structures
do not make reception technically impossi- SECTION 1 ACCESSORY BUILDINGS
ble and are flexible enough to account for AND STRUCTURES
the unique reception requirements of the Section 1 1 An accessory building attached
individual lots within their boundaries
to a principal building is considered part
Conclusion
of the principal building and shall adhere
to the yard requirements for the princiFor the reasons above, I conclude that,
pal building
assuming that the FCC had authority to
issue the Order, the Maplewood Ordinance Section 1.2. The distance from an accessory building to a principal building shall
is preempted by 47 CFR 25.201. I thus
not be less than 10 feet nor less than 6
need not reach plaintiffs' constitutional
feet from another accessory building or a
claims.
property line
If the FCC Order is valid plaintiffs would
Section
1 3: The distance from an accessobe entitled to summary judgment declaring
ry building to a side property line shall
the Ordinance invalid, enjoining its enforcenot be less than the side yard requirement and awarding plaintiffs attorney's
ments of the principal budding.
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 1988 It
would follow that defendant's motion to SECTION 2. DISH ANTENNAE
dismiss the preemption claim and for fail- Section 2 1. A receiving dish antennae (or
ure to apply for a variance should be desatellite receiving station) shall be connied on the merits and that defendant's
sidered an accessory structure.
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Section 2.2: A receiving dish antennae
shall be no more than 6 f e e t in height
m e a s u r e d at the highest point of its oute r circumference or any extension, including the supporting structure.
It
shall be located in the rear yard only.
On corner lots, which have no defined
rear yard, it shall be located in a side
yard a minimum of t w o times the required front setback from the street line
m e a s u r e d at its closest point on its circ u m f e r e n c e , a t any e x t e n s i o n or to its
supporting structure, ^whichever is closest.
Section 2.3: A transmitting dish antennae
is not a permitted use.
S E C T I O N 3. B U F F E R S FOR DISH ANTENNAE
Section 3.1 A dish antennae [sic] shall be
s c r e e n e d from view from adjoining properties and s t r e e t s by e v e r g r e e n planting,
which shall be at least six feet in height
a t the time of planting.

even grossly negligent withholding of any
material information from PTO.
Judgment for plaintiff.

Patents *=>312(6)
Alleged infringer failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that inventors or their counsel were guilty of any
intentional or even grossly negligent withholding of any material information before
Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution or reexamination of patents disclosing ventricular defibrillation devices and,
thus, patents w e r e not invalid for inequitable conduct before PTO.

Timothy J. Malloy, Lawrence M. Jarvis,
Gregory J. Vogler, Chicago, 111., Richard G.
Schneider, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff
Philip S Johnson, Albert W Preston,
John J Mackiewicz, Gary H. Levin, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM A N D ORDER
DITTER, District Judge.

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY,

Plaintiff",

v.
M E D T R O N I C , INC., D e f e n d a n t .
Civ. A. N o . 8 3 - 5 3 9 3 .
United S t a t e s District Court,
E.D. Pennsylvania.
April 21, 1988.
Owner of patents disclosing ventricular defibrillation devices b r o u g h t infringem e n t action. On issue of w h e t h e r patents
w e r e unenforceable for inequitable conduct
before P a t e n t and Trademark Office, the
District Court, Ditter, J., held that alleged
infringer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that inventors or their
counsel w e r e guilty of any intentional or
I.

Plaintiff Eh Lilly and Company brought
this suit against defendant Medtronic, Inc.
alleging i n f n n g e m e n t by Medtronic of t w o
United States patents, No. Re 27,757, reexamined and issued as Bl Re. 27,757 (the 757
patent) and No. 3,942,536, reexamined and
issued as Bl 3,942,536 (the 536 patent). At
the close of Medtronic's case, with the
agreement of the parties. I granted Lilly's
motion for a directed verdict with regard to
the validity of the 536 patent and its inf n n g e m e n t by Medtronic's Model 7210 and
its associated leads. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Lilly, having found Medtronic's devices to infringe
the claims of the 757 patent. The jury also
decided that Medtronic's infringement of
the 757 and 536 patents was willful. The
parties agreed to submit for my determination the issue as to whether the alleged
inequitable conduct of the patents' inventors, 1 Dr. Michel Mirowski and Dr. Morton

Dr. Michel Mtrowski is the inventor of the 757
patent. Dr. Mirowski, Dr. Morton Mower, and
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Rollin H. Denniston. a Medtronic engineer, are
listed as the inventors of the 536 patent.
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1 one showing it behind the satellite, and this one showing it
2 from a side view, I think, with at least one of the
3 extensions?
4

A

Yes, they are.

5

Q

Okay.

I'd ask you to note specifically, well, in

6

both Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, you

7

testified earlier—for my clarification, you indicated that

8

the only portion of the house that was brick was the chimney;

9 does this not indicate an entire side that's brick, and
10 also a front facing that's brick?
11

A

No.

That's imitation.

12

Q

Oh, that's imitation—

13

A

Imitation.

14

Q

—brick?

15

A

I think it's made of tar product of some kind.

16

Q

Okay.

Now, you've indicated that you had no other

17 alternative for the placing of your satellite dish; isn't it
18 true that the City has advised you that you could apply for a
19 variance?
20

A

In that—can I respond to that?

21

Q

Well, yes, I would like a response, preferably with

22 a yes or a no.

Has the City—

MR. BYBEE:

23

I would object to a yes or no, your

24 Honor, if he requires m o r e —
THE WITNESS:

25

Do you want just a yes or a no?
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THE COURT:

1

THE WITNESS:

2
3

6

Q

21
22

Okay.

Q

And they've told you that you could apply

Well, i t — a t the point that we're here, but not at
Okay.

This i s — t h i s is over a period of

All right.

So, you could have—during this period,

you could h a v e — w e ' r e now six months down the line.
A

They told me at the first time I talked to them

that they hadn't granted any variances.
Q

Okay.

But they didn't tell you they wouldn't

grant yours necessarily, did they?

19
20

Q

t went down and talked to them.

time,

17
18

No.

the initial point.

15
16

A

A

13
14

Maybe this will make it easier.

for a variance, is that not correct?

10

12

Well, my question is, h a s — l e t me

Have you ever applied for a variance?

8

11

Could I tell what happened, leading

(By Mr. Hamp)

rephrase the question.

7

9

You may respond.

up to it?

4
5

No.

A

T h e — i n effect, what I'm saying is, yes, there

Q

You've never really applied for it to find out;

was—

isn't that correct?
A

Well, actually, as I recall that conversation,

23
24
25

which you're not asking me about, they said if I didn't get
a variance, they would take away my business license also,
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1

and that's what happened in that conversation.

2

is extortion, you didn't ask me that, but that's what that

3

conversation was all about.

4
5

Q

That, to m e ,

Those people aren f t here that were during that

conversation, and they can't provide i t —

6

A

Well, Craig is here.

7 J

Q

It's not relevant.

A

Craig is here.

9

Q

And i t —

10

A

It may not be relevant to you, but it is relevant

8

11 to m e .

If someone tells me that something that's never

12 been granted, they'll give me
MR. HAMP:

13

a—

Your Honor, if I may request an

14 instruction from the Court to the witness to answer what
15 I'm asking about.

We keep on getting into all these extra

16 issues that are not before the Court.
THE COURT:

17

18 specific, Mr. Hamp.

Well, but your questions are not
Ask a specific question and I'll

19 instruct him to answer specifically.
20

Q

(By Mr. Hamp)

Isn't it your understanding that if

21 a variance were granted to you, that that would allow your
22 satellite dish to be exactly in the spot where it is at?
23

A

Yes.

That's clear to m e .

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

I t ' s — i t may be t h a t —
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

Just answer the question, sir.
It may not be there also, because

3 they may grant the variance to put it someplace else, s o 4

so it's not clear to me that it would be in that exact s a m e —

5

it may or may not be there; depends on where they grant the

6 variance to put it.
Q

7
8

(By Mr. Hamp)

Okay.

But there is a possibility

that it could be there?

9

A

Yeah.

There's a possibility it could be there.

10

Q

Hasn't the—and hasn't the City also indicated that

11 due to the fact that you don't have a back yard, that a
12 variance may well be granted?
A

13

No, not up 'til this moment.
MR. HAMP:

14

I have nothing further for this witness,

15 your Honor.
16

THE COURT:

Mr. Bybee, any redirect?

17

MR. BYBEE:

No.

18

THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

19

Nothing, your Honor.
You may step down.

If you'll have a seat at the table again.

20

MR. BYBEE:

We have no other witnesses, your Honor.'

21

THE COURT:

Any rebuttal witnesses?

22

MR. HAMP:

Briefly, your Honor.

We would call

23 Mr. Spangenberg again.
24
25 oath.

THE COURT:

Mr. Spangenberg, you're still under

If you'll take the stand, please.
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MR. Jeffery 0. Johnson:

s
^

When I was at the research center on April 10, 1989, I informed
you that I could not find the Oath of Office Certificates for
Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson, R. Paul Van Dam, Tom L.
Allen and Edward T. Alter for 1989. I also informed you that
I could not find in the same file any of the Oath of Office
Certificates for any of the members of the 1989 Utah Legislature.
I reported the absence of those records to Kathy Pickering who
spoke to Gordon R. Hall and Mr. Butler about their not being
on file at the Archives, I also reported it to David Hansen,
KSL, KTVX, Associated Press, The Deseret News, and the Sheriff's
office the same afternoon I met with you, Val Wilson and
Christie.

Y

As you suggested I am writing you for a written response to
this serious matter. Utah law provides that the Oath of Office
Vshall be filed in the Department of Archives. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amendedr^S^EtzB' s a Y s that all state officers
shall file their oath of office in the Department of Archives.
Utah Code Annptated£51*2-T) requires that to be done within sixty
J days or the office shall be declared vacant.

s*

I was informed by Mr. Val Wilson at the research center that
the oaths of office not on file on April 10, 1989 in the Department of Archives for the five executive officers named above
were delivered to the Archives Department on April 11, 1989.
Christie told me that she received a hand full of Oath of Office
Certificates from a man she did not know on Tuesday, April 11,
1989, and that among them were the ones for Governor and Lt.
Governor among others she was unable to verify when I talked
to her on the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1989.

>
\

Under provisions of the Utah Criminal Code it is unlawful to
act in any public office without filing the required oath of
office. Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203 states the nature of the
offense. I would ask you to verify immediately in writing the
time, date and place those five Oath of Office Certificates
were filed and by whom they were delivered and received. A
Court document was filed on April 12, 1989 concerning the failure
to file the oaths of office for the five state executive
officers, your verification is needed. I would also ask you
to verify the presence or absence of the oaths of office certificates for the members of the Utah Legislature and the time,
date and place of filing, and by whom delivered and by whom
received«
dsLc^lx
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Is the state's
top officeholder
really official?
Gov. Norm Bangerter

SMPag*B1

Saturday, April 15,1989

Elected officials
aren't official,
activist says
IT
By Jay Evensen

Deseret News staff writer

Just when state officials were getting used
to the jobs they were elected to last year,
along comes an activist who tells them they
really aren't in office.
Lawrence Topham. a constitutionalist who
once paid a candidate filing fee with silver
dollars worth far more than their face value,
says every state officeholder in Utah has broken the law by failing to file an oath of office
with the State Archives Division.
Topham, who once ran for governor as an
American Party candidate but was ousted
from that party after an internal dispute last
year, is linking that law with another one requiring elected officials to qualify for their
offices within 60 days of the start of their
terms.
In letters delivered to state officials this
week, he says every elected official, including
the governor, is no longer in office.

TOPHAM
Continued from B1
State officials acted puzzled Friday when confronted with the
claims.
"The governor took the oath of office in January... Remember?" said
Bud Scruggs, chief of staff to Gov.
Norm Bangerter.
Jeffery Johnson, state archives director, said he believes the law requires oaths of office to be filed only
for historical purposes. That law
does not include a time limit, he said.
But, since Topham began his crusade last week, all the oaths of office
from January have been placed on
file, Johnson said.
Meanwhile, state officials say the
public should rest assured that government is functioning normally and
that the results of November's election still stand.
"We have a video tape of the
swearing-in ceremony; the best proof
you-could have," said Lt. Gov. Val
Oveson.
ITYHTRTT

"CC-7"

Vefft He.

JO^AJSCVO

Of tirie
sz.
b&su SZ-i-z

RittiiGuoes SHOULD tifft£
/fad S^-A-/ hlcn- S*i-\-xfoil>
THTE

0FT1CIAL OATHS AND BONDS

52-M

52-1-2. Bonds to state -— Approval and recording — Filing
of oaths.
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless othermse provided shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives.

CHAPTER 2
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE
Section
62-2-1.

Tim* in which to qualify — Failure
— Office declared vacant

52-2-1. Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office declared vacant
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or
any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall befilledas
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there217
EXHIBIT

f,

CC-3"

PART 2
ABUSE OF OFFICE
Section
76-8-201.
76-8-202.
76-8-203.

Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acts or failure of duty.
Official misconduct — Unlawful acts
based on "inside** information.
Unofficial misconduct.

76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acts or failure of duty.
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
if with an intent to benefit himself or another or to
harm another, he knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purport* to be an act of his office, or
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed
on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his
office.
ir3
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions
of a public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required
oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has expired and the successor
has been elected or appointed and has qualified,
or after fiis office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retainsfromhis
successor in office or other person entitled to the
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or
other writings appertaining or belonging to his
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the
same.
(2) Unofficial

mi conduct i* a CUM B miide-

State of Utah
Department of Administrative Services

Division of Archives & Records Service
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Jeffery O. Johnson
Director

State Capitol Archives Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114
(801)538-3012

April 17, 1989

Lawrence Rey Topham
423 7th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Dear Mr. Topham:
In answer to your letter of April 14, the State Archives received the Oath of
Office Certificates for Tom L. Allen, State Auditor; Edward T. Alter, State
Treasure; R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General; W. Val Oveson, Lt. Governor; and
Norman H. Bangerter, Governor on April 11. They are all dated January 2, 1989
and signed by Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court. We
have not received the Oaths from the 1989 Legislature.
If we can be of further service to you, please let us know.
Sincerely,

Jeffe
c. David D. Hansen, Lt. Governor's Office
c. Kirk Waldron
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UTAH
U,N,2 - BC-OATHDISPUTE*
04-1? 0609 BC-Oath Dispute,500
Conservative Activist Says Governor* Officials Violated Statute
By MICHAEL WHITE
Associated Press Uriter
SALT LAKE CITY <AP) - A conservative activist believes Gov* Norm Bangerter
and other top state officials* including tne entire Legislature* have forfeited
their right to office by overlooking an obscure bit of paper work 4
Lawrence Topham* a former American Party candidate for governor* contends
that by failing to promptly file oaths of office with the Division of Archives*
most of the state's top elective offices must be vacated*
State officials say it's true that the oaths were not filed according to
the statutory requirements* but they say it's unlikely the oversight will
topple the Bangerter administration*
XN
The important thing is the people who were elected to office took the
oath of office* There was a swearing in* There was an inauguration ceremony*
said Deputy Lt* Gov. Dave Hansen* who supervises state elections*
Topham contends that the failure to comply with the statute signifies a
general governmental disregard for law*
XN
Ue think this is not just a light matter* " said Topham* XNThe whole
nation has become corrupted and the corruption is so pervasive* things are that
they don't feel (this requirement) needs to be taken care of* But the question
is* are they really in office?''
One state statute* section 52-1-2 of the Utah Code* requires that elected
officials to file a signed oath with the Archives Division* Topham links this
to section 52-2-1* which states that if a candidate fails to qualify within 60
days* the office shall be declared vacant*
Topham contends that by failing to file the oaths within the time period*
the offices of governor* lieutenant governor* attorney general* auditor*
treasurer* several Supreme Court justice seats and most seats in the
Legislature should be declared vacant*
Topham said those who did not file also violated section 76-8-201* which
declares that an officehglder is guilty of unofficial misconduct* a class B
misdemeanor* if he or she fails to take and file the required oath of office*
Finally* Topham argues that because oaths for the state's top rive elected
officials - the governor* lieutenant governor* attorney general* auditor and
treasurer - were signed after the 60-day period* but dated Jan* 2* the day
officeholders were sworn in* officials are guilty of falsifying documenrbs*
But Hansen said the form requires the date of the swearing in* not the date
the forms were signed*
vx
That's what it asks for*'' Hansen said*
A long-time activist and self-styled constitutionalist* Topham has bee^ a
familiar figure in Utah political circles* In 1?88 he filed an action forcing
the American Party to drop a registration fee tor delegates to its state
convention* He argued that the party was charging delegates for the right to
vote •
An advocate of a return to the silver standard* he does not consider U*S*
currency to be legal tender avid refuses to accept it as pay or use it* He once
used silver dollars to pay a candidacy filing fee* even though the coins were
worth far more than the dollar amount of the fee*
He said he refuses to conduct any transaction that would require him to use
notes that are not backed by precious n>etal*
(MORE)

SLUG: AEOII71?

PAGE:

2

Topham said he plans to file a legal complaint over the failure to file the
oaths* but worries he may not be able to find a judge who is not affected by
the oath situation*
Since apparently no member of the state Senate filed his oath* and judicial
appointees are confirmed by the Senate* he believes many judgeships also would
be declared vacant if he can prove his case*

STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN
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LAKE CITY
84114

May 15, 1989
Lawrence Rey Topham
423 7th Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Dear Larry:
Your recent inquiry to the Governor's Chief of Staff, Mr.
H. E. Scruggs, has been referred to me for comment.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 52-2-1 simply states
that "any person duly elected" who "fails to qualify for such
office within 60 days after the date of beginning of the term
of office for which he was elected or appointed, such office
shall there upon become vacant and shall be filled as provided
by law." Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 52-1-2 simply
requires that "the Oaths of Office of all state officials shall
be filed with a Division of Archives,"
It is quite clear that the filing of the Oath of Office is
a formality required for historical purposes and is not a
condition of qualification. I am informed that an informal
Attorney General's opinion verifies that position.
Your activism and intent of scholarship is commendable;
however, in this case, as stated above I believe a faulty
interpretation of the two paragraphs have been made.
Sincerely,

^etfglas <$5. Bischoff
Deputy Chief of Staff
DGB/rw

Nw

-^
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH CIRCUIT COURTS, INCLUDING TRIAL
COURT, AND THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND ARE UNAUTHORIZED
BY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LACK JURISDICTION
AND LACK ALL LAWFUL JUDICIAL POWER TO ACT,
AND HAVE AND ARE NOW DENYING DUE PROCESS.
The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time.
Utah Const., Art I, Sees. 7 and 15; Art IV, Sec. 10. Utah
Code Ann., Sees. 25-5-4, 52-1-2, 52-2-1, 76-1-301, 76-8-203
61-1-1; 76-10-1602 and 1603. U.S Const., Art I, Sees. 8, 9,
and 10; Art VI; Art. VII; 1 Stat 23 and 246; 18 USCA 2-8,
241, 242, 331-334, 371, 471-473, 892-894, 1341, 1962-1965.
The question of jurisdiction is raised in this case based on
the fact that the persons elected to the Utah Senate, the
Utah House of Representatives, to the executive offices of
Governor of Utah, Lieutenant Governor of Utah, Utah State
Auditor, Utah State Treasurer, Utah Attorney General, and
three of the persons elected to become justices of the Utah
Supreme Court, all failed to file the Constitutionally and
statutorily required oath of office certificates in 1987 and
in 1989, before entering the duties of those respective
offices, and by failing to file their oaths of office they
did not acquire the power to act as public officials
following their elections to office and by failing to take,
subscribe and file their respective oaths of office within
sixty days after the beginning of their respective terms,
the offices all became vacant as a matter of law and all of
their exercise or attempted exercise as public servants of

the functions of public office constituted unofficial
misconduct.

Their acts of office performed while they were

not officially in office are all unconstitutional, unlawful,
null and void.

As a result of the failure of these elected

public servants and the fact that the persons elected to the
Utah Senate have failed to take, subscribe and file the
required oath of office for the past fourteen and one half
years, according to the official records on deposit in the
Utah Division of Archives, all legislation and appointments
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate were
unconstitutional, unlawful, unofficial, criminal and void.
This includes the unofficial acts of creating the Utah
Circuit Courts and the Utah Court of Appeals, and
appointments made thereto, as well as appointments to the
Supreme Court from 1975 until June 30, 1989.

Mr. Palmer has

personally searched the records at the Utah Division of
Archives and has personal knowledge of persons in and out of
government who researched the records, contacted the
personnel in the office of the clerk of the Supreme court
to inquire where the required oaths of office were for
Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart and Michael D. Zimmerman
whose oaths were not in the archives on the 20th day of
March 1989, more than sixty days after the terms of office
began for 1989 and more than two years and sixty days after
Gordon R. Hall's term of office began on January 7, 1987,
so that Gordon R. Hall was not a public official on the Utah
Supreme Court at the time he unofficially acted in that

office on January 2, 1989, at the inauguration ceremony for
the seven elected persons who failed to file their oaths
following that unofficial ceremony.

After persons in the

Supreme Court clerkfs office were contacted and told the 3
justice's oaths were not filed, as of the 20th day of March,
1989, false oaths were fraudulently made out, backdated,
signed, and delivered to the Utah Division of Archives
between March 20, 1989 and April 10, 1989.

On April 11,

1989, one day after persons in the Supreme Court Clerk's
office, including the clerk, and persons in the Lieutenant
Governorfs office, including the deputy "Lt. Governor", were
notified that the oaths of office were not on file for the
five executive officers, and that the offices were vacant,
because the five persons had not qualified for office
following their elections, those oaths were also falsely
made, backdated, subscribed and filed on the 11th day of
April, 1989, ninty nine days after the term of office began.
Their failure to file their oaths was reported to the Salt
County Sherriff's office, KSL Television, KTVX Television,
the Deseret News, and the Associated Press on the 10th day
of April, 1989.

The matter was treated very lightly, until

written letters and copies of the Utah Statutes were taken
to the same offices and, finally, The Deseret News published
an article which began on the front page on April 15, 1989.
The article showed a picture of Norman H. Bangerter, and
asked, "Is the state's top officeholder really official?"
On April 19, 1989, the Associated Press released a wire
story on the same subject which indicated that the deputy

Lieutenant Governor admitted that they backdated the oaths.
On June 12, 1989, KSL Television presented a six and a half
minute story involving the failure of the legislative,
executive and judicial officers to file their oaths of
office as required by law.

The matter was also reported to

the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to the chief of the
justice division in a 12 page sworn notarized statement on
the 18th day of April, 1989, and to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation because Utah no longer has a republican form
of Government as guaranteed to the people of Utah by the
Constitution of the United States of America.

There are no

public officials of the State of Utah to resolve the matter
and the "federal Government" has a vested interest in not
resolving the problem.

The matter was taken to the "Circuit

Court Judge" who was assigned to receive criminal complaints
on April 18, 1989, but Paul G. Grant, refused to even look
at the 12 page sworn notarized statement made that day in
the Utah Division of Archives after a search had been made
again for the oaths of office for the members of the Utah
Legislature for the years 1987 and 1989, and for the elected
members of the Senate back to 1983. No oaths of office were
found for all of those years for the Senate.

Copies of the

false oaths of office of Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson,
Tom L. Allen, Edward T. Alter, R. Paul Van Dam, I. Daniel,
Stewart and Michael D. Zimmerman, were delivered to the FBI
with a copy of the complaint that was given to Walter

Ellett, who said he was the chief of the Justice Division,
On May 26, 1989, David Yocum, Walter Ellett, Norman D.
Hayward and a number of people met in the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's office where these people were all told by David
Yocum and Mr. Ellett that they were not going to do anything
about the failure of the legislative, and the executive, and
the judicial, elected public servants, to file the required
oaths of office or for falsifying of the sworn statements by
those men unlawfully impersonating executive and judicial
officers in the Executive Department and the Judicial
Department of the government of the State of Utah.
What the defendant is learning about government in Utah
and in the United States is that those persons elected and
appointed to public office can not be trusted, no matter
what office they were elected or appointed to fill.

Even

their oath of office is not important and falsifying it is
just routine by the Supreme Court's chief "Justice" and by
the other executive and judicial "officers" who work with or
aid and abet him, so they can collect all that false paper
security.

But this all leads to one clear conclusion.

The

Circuit Courts in Utah and the Utah Court of Appeals and the
Utah Supreme Court have lost all legitimate claim to lawful
and Constitutional jurisdiction, and Mr. Palmer has been
denied due process of law for numerous reasons.

Utah Code

Ann. 76-8-203. The functions in every department of Utah
State government are unofficial, unconstitutional and void,
and criminal

(Appellant's exhibits in Addendum "CC")

Point II.
EVERY PERSON HAS AN INALIENABLE RIGHT
TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS AND TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT TO
OWN AND CONTROL PROPERTY AND RECEIVE
FREELY UNABRIDGED ACCESS TO FREE SPEECH,
THE FREE PRESS, RELIGION, PEACEABLE
ASSEMBLY AND REDRESS OF GREIVANCES.
Unalienable individual rights, the United States
Constitution, United States felony statutes, among other
United States statutes supercede the Communication
Commission (FCC) regulation which preempts State and Local
regulation of earth satellite receive only antennas.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
federal law (particularly felony statutes) may preempt a
state law where conflict exists between the federal and
state law.
2.

U.S. Constitition, Article VI.

Similarly federal regulations may preempt state and

local laws.

Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81 L.Ed.2d 580

(1984) . Federal regulation preempts local law when Congress
or the federal agency has exercised complete authority in
the area in question and if the agency is legally authorized
to preempt local law.

New York v. FCC, 100 L.Ed.2d 45, 57-

59 (1988).
In this case both Congress and the FCC have exercised
their regulatory authority over satellite receive only dish
antennas.

Even if the FCC had not preempted state and local

zoning, the U. S. and Utah Constitutions preclude the
possibility of the Congress, the FCC, the State or the City

from making a law that prevents reception of radio and
television signals by the people of the United States or of
the State of Utah.

Mr. Palmer's right to receive satellite

signals is not regulated by Congress and the FCC.

The

Constitution forbids Congress and the FCC from interfering
with his right to receive free speech and to receive free
1
press.
If Congress can limit freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, then there is no freedom of speech and no
freedom of the press.

If the State and City can abridge

these freedoms then the United States and Utah Constitution
have failed to protect the rights of the people.

1
First Amendment Cases:
Cord Meyer Development Co. v. Bell Bay Drugs, 229 N.E.2d 44
(S.Ct N.Y.1967). Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 514 (1977). People of Canton Township v. Brenner, Case
No. 85 CT 3551, (35th Judicial Cir., State of Michigan,
September 26, 1985). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). Shad v. Borough of Mt. Ephram, 452 U.S. 61
(1981). Swain v. County of Winnebago, 250 N.E.2d 439 (111.
App. 1969). United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Comsumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Fifth Amendment Cases:
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
(1978) .
Fourteeth Amendment Cases:
Bourgeois v. Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana, 628 F. Supp
159 (E.D. La. 1986) . Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, (1978). Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) .
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POINT III.
SALT LAKE CITY'S ORDINANCE DIFFERENTIATES
BETWEEN SATELLITE RECEIVE-ONLY ANTENNAS AND
OTHER TYPES OF ANTENNA FACILITIES; DOES NOT HAVE
A REASONABLE AND CLEARLY DEFINED HEALTH, SAFETY
OR AESTHETIC OBJECTIVE; AND THE CITY'S ORDINANCE
OPERATES TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE LIMITATIONS
ON, OR PREVENT, RECEPTION OF SATELLITE DELIVERED
SIGNALS BY RECEIVE-ONLY ANTENNAS AND TO IMPOSE
COSTS ON THE USERS OF SUCH ANTENNAS THAT ARE
EXCESSIVE IN LIGHT OF THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION COST OF THE EQUIPMENT, AND IS PREEMPTED BY
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, AND BY
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND 47 CFR 25.104.
1.

Salt Lake City's ordinance specifically regulates

satellite antennaes only and limits them to required back
yards of lots containing 5000 square feet or more, and does
not permit them to be located at any other location or to be
used at all on nonconforming land, or as, or on, a
nonconforming structure, or as a nonconforming use without
a special permit or variance after payment of an illegal and
false fee, and which permit can only be acquired after the
holding of an advertised public hearing, regardless of the
circumstances, and the ordinance prohibits all other types
of antennas (including all radio, VHF and UHF), on property
in the entire city, and imposes a daily fine of one thousand
false dollars and up to six months in jail upon users who
place the satellite antennaes anywhere else, and requires
the enforcement officers to prevent the use of any land,
structure or premises that locates a satellite antennae any
where else, all of which is expressly contrary to the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including felony

-*t- Db-S

statutes, and expressly contrary to the Constitution and
laws of the State of Utah as pointed out in this reply brief
and in appellant's original brief on appeal, and is
expressly contrary to the Federal District Court decision
in Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024
(D.N.J. 1988), which was a civil rights action brought under
42 U.S.C.A. 1983, in which the backyard only requirement of
the Township of Maplewood, New Jersey was declared void, for
conflicting with federal law, and for being expressly
preempted by 47 CFR 25.104, and for user variance provision.
2.

The Salt Lake zoning ordinance is clearly preempted

by federal law because the City ordinance does most clearly
differentiate between satellite receive only antennaes and
other types of antennas and has unreasonable and not clearly
defined health, safety or aesthetic objectives, and it does
operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent
reception of signals and is insensitive to the technical
nature and specific unobstructed, clear line of sight,
reception "open window" requirements of Satellite Antennas
necessary in order to receive and reflect and transmit the
satellite received signals on any given site. Van Meter v.
Township of Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988),
(Set out VERBATIM IN APPENDIX "AA")

This is grounds for

reversal of the trial court, even if the trial court had had
lawful jurisdiction, which it never obtained. The Utah Court
of Appeals not only lacks appellate jurisdiction, but lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to question the authority of the
FCC relative to the preemption order, Van Meter, supra 1032.

Point IV.
MR. PALMER1S 150 ISSUES ARE GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL.
The balance of Mr. Palmer's 150 issues including the
trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not
compensated in gold and silver Coin and defendant's fine not
being valid because tender was in void currency rather than
current gold and silver Coin not only have substantial merit
but are vital to due process of law and the survival of the
United States of America as a free and independent nation.
No person can Constitutionally qualify for the office of a
judge in the United States of America who is not compensated
in gold and silver Coin of undiminished value according to a
fixed standard of weight and value measured in units of
silver, because, if otherwise, Constitutional law ends and
unconstitutional law begins.
Mr. Palmer asserts every provision of the United States
and Utah Constitutions and all the laws made pursuant
thereto or in pursuance thereof, in his defense, and waives
none of them at anytime.

Every Provision of the Utah and

United States Constitutions are relevant to his defense, and
to the existence of the United States as a Constitutional
Republic.

Diminish the quanitity of silver in the Dollar

and you diminish the dollar itself and the compensation of
every public officer, legislative, executive and judicial,
and if that is possible, then the President and judges are
not subject to receiving undiminished compensation during
their term of office or during good behavior.

Of course,

a term and good behavior ends as the judge begins to uphold

unconstitutional void notes and tokens rather than gold and
silver Coin at full weight and value and the fraudulent
government replaces the true government and the correct
principles of government are replaced with the wisdom of
unwise men and women, who sell themselves for that which has
no value, worthless, promiseless, void notes, and corrupted
token coins made from the dross of silver and gold, and
deceits, deceptions and lying words replace the truth in
government, and the oath bound servants of the people become
the unoathbound tyrants of the corrupted nation and states
in the United States of America and government breaks down
and fails in the eyes of those at home and abroad and the
people are led into bondage and captivity because they have
accepted paper for gold, and dross for silver, and lies for
truth, and unsubcribed and unfiled oaths of office as
subscribed and filed oaths of office, and invalid laws for
valid laws, invalid constitutional amendments for valid
constitutional provisions, unauthorized courts for
authorized courts, unauthorized judges for authorized
judges, void court decisions for valid decisions, wickedness
for happiness, foolishness for wisdom, and errors for
accuracy, incompleteness for completeness, incompentency for
competency,

corruption for incorruption, void divorces and

void marriages for valid marriages.

Thus, this corruption

continues to increase in the earth as the just are divided,
persecuted and dishonored by the gainsayers and the power
seekers because of evil money and wickedness in high places,
-34- 3>D-//

POINT V.
SALT LAKE CITY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEPRIVED MR. PALMER
OF A BUSINESS LICENSE BECAUSE HE DID NOT APPLY FOR A
VARIANCE FOR A SATELLITE ANTENNA WHEN U. S. AND UTAH
CONSTITUTIONS PROHIBIT, AND FEDERAL LAW PREEMPT, STATE
AND LOCAL ZONING OR "OTHER REGULATION" OF SATELLITE
ANTENNAS WHICH PREVENT RECEPTION OF SATELLITE SIGNALS.
Mr. Palmer was denied a business license by the Salt
Lake City License Department in violation of 47 CFR 25.104
in order to control and regulate satellite antennae use by
means of criminal conspiracy and unlawful coercion under
preempted, unlawful, unconstitutional and void city license
ordinances which are used to corruptly enforce void zoning
ordinances by first requiring a business license to do
business in the City and then corruptly denying a business
license without due process of law, and based only on false
accusations by zoning department personnel, thus regulating
use of a satellite antenna by denial of a business license,
thereby using "other regulation" to interfere with either
the transmission or reception, or both, of a federally
regulated satellite signal, and also interfering with the
rights of Mr. Palmer in violation of the United States
Constitution, Amend. I; 18 U.S.C.A. 1367, 47 U.S.C.A. 151,
47 U.S.C.A. 705;

18 U.S.C.A. 241, and 242; 47 CFR 25.104,

and Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sees. 7, 15, among others.
Ordinance under which satellite dish antenna
users who could not achieve reception within
constraints imposed by ordinance could apply
for a zoning variance would not be satisfactory
and would not save ordinance, which placed an
unreasonable restriction on signal reception,
from preemption by Federal Communications
Commission order. Van Meter v. Township of
Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024, 1025. (D.N.J. 1988)
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When Mr. Palmer went to renew his business license for
the year 1988, on February 15, 1988, Edna M. Drake and Frank
Friberg, Salt Lake City Corporation's License Department
enforcement officers, began processing the license forms and
had started typing the forms as Mr. Palmer's records were
brought up on the computer screen and then they stopped
processing the forms.

They told Mr. Palmer the computer

showed that the zoning department had placed a hold on the
business license because of some problem with a satellite
antenna, and they told Mr. Palmer he would have to clear
that problem up with Mr. Spangenberg in zoning before they
could issue him a license.

They both gave Mr. Palmer their

business cards (Appellant's Brief on Appeal Appendix "V").
These persons were both subpoenaed to testify in Mr.
Palmer's defense but the subpoenas were quashed ex parte
without a hearing and Mr. Palmer's hired attorney failed to
have these persons subpoenaed for the trial.

(Copies of the

subpoenas are in Appellant's Brief on Appeal Appendix at H7
and Hll).
This conduct unconstitutionally deprived Mr. Palmer of
his secured right to participate in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce based on zoning department decisions and business
department decisions relating to a satellite antenna that
was claimed by the zoning department personnel to be placed
improperly at Mr. Palmer's licensed business location at
933 Pennsylvania Place in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December
16, 1987, and continuously thereafter.

Mr. Palmer showed

Mr. Spangenberg his business license certificate for 1987.

Mr. Spangenberg said, "I see no problem with this license."
Mr. Palmer told Mr. Spangenberg, "I have an inalienable
right to have a satellite antenna," and that state and local
zoning and "other regulation" of satellite antennas is
preempted by federal law and that it is a federal felony to
interfere with his right to receive the satellite signals.
Mr. Palmer was not only charged with violating the City
antenna ordinance provisions but he was denied his right to
obtain a city license to continue to trade in interstate and
foreign commerce because of false criminal charges brought
against him because of his excercise of his inalienable
right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press and of
freedom of religion and freedom to peaceably assemble, and
of his inalienable right to life, liberty and property.
The zoning "officers" told Mr. Palmer he would have to
apply for a variance by paying Salt Lake City Corporation a
fee of $50 (Fifty Dollars) and that the department had never
issued a variance for a satellite antenna.

They said if Mr.

Palmer didn't apply for a variance for the satellite antenna
they would take away his business license, but if Mr. Palmer
would apply for a variance, then they would forget about the
business license and go away and leave Mr. Palmer alone.
Mr. Palmer said, that is extortion. (TR 121, 122, 123, 124;
Appendix "BB) (Also see the Eight (8) page letter to Mr.
Spangenberg, et al, of January 4, 1988, in Appendix "I" of
Apellantfs Brief on Appeal, and copies of the 1984 and 1987
business license certificates in Appendix "V" of Appellant's
Brief on Appeal.)

POINT VI.
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION DID FALL
VERY FAR BELOW ANY STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS;
DEFENDANT HAS PROVED SPECIFIC, IDENTIFIED ACTS
AND OMISSIONS THAT FALL OUTSIDE THE WIDE RANGE
OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENT ASSISTANCE AND THOSE
ACTS AND OMISSIONS ARE NOT SPECULATIVE BUT ARE IN
REALITY FACTS WHICH SHOW AFFIRMATIVELY REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ERROR THE TRIAL
RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THE JURY
VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED COMPLETELY WITH
ALL CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY OF THE VERDICT GONE.
U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. 6.
Edna M. Drake and Frank Friberg, of Salt Lake City
Corporation's License Department, among others, and also
Mr. Craig Spangenberg and Mr. Merrill Nelson of zoning
were subpoenaed by Mr. Palmer to testify in Mr. Palmer's
defense but the court denied him compulsory service of
process by quashing the subpoenas ex parte without a hearing
and Mr. Palmer's hired attorney (a purported officer of the
court) failed to subpoena these witnesses for trial and
neglected to inform Mr. Palmer until just before the start
of the July 5, 1988, jury trial, that they had not been
subpoenaed as witnesses to testify in his defense along with
the other persons the attorney failed to subpoena.
Besides failing to prepare for the trial, the attorney
failed to subpoena the defense witnesses demanded by and
previously subpoenaed by the defendant, Mr. Palmer. Mr.
Palmer fully expected the witnesses he named in his
subpoenas to be subpoenaed by his attorney to testify for
his defense, but the attorney failed to even prepare the
subpoenas and he also failed to tell the defendant that they
would not be subpoenaed for his defense when their testimony

was crucial to establish the record, essential to receiving
a fair and impartial trial, and critical to receiving due
process of law in exercise of the accused's right to defend
in person or by counsel.

Counsel, instead of assisting in

the defense, first agreed that the defendant was right, then
avoided the defendant, while continually promising to write
and file a brief or memorandum of law ordered by the court
to be filed in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.

He did not perform that specific

service for which he was hired, and which, he promised he
would do.

Mr. Bybee omitted filing the brief and extremely

important memorandum, the main purpose for which he was
hired and for which he was paid in true United States coined
money silver dollar units.

(Appellant's Brief on Appeal

Appendix Gl, Gil, G12, G13), U.S. Const. Art. I, Sees. 8-10
Except for court room experience, Mr. Palmer was far
better informed and prepared for trial than Mr. Bybee.

Mr.

Bybee directly interfered with and hindered his defense.
The only witness the defense counsel called was the
defendant and had him testify against himself, hinging Mr.
Palmer's whole defense on the fact that there was no
evidence that Mr. Palmer had placed the Satellite antenna
on his property on or about January 6, 1988, because it had
been placed there by someone else more than two full years
before January 6, 1988.

The attorney assured the defendant

that there was no possible way that he could be convicted
for doing something on January 6, 1988, that had been done
in November of 1985, by another person (TR 161).

Mr. Bybee failed to fully and knowledgeably argue the
law, failed to ask the defendant many pertinent questions
during the trial, failed to prepare the necessary jury
instructions for the defense.

The jury instructions were

hastily and very poorly drawn up without the participation
of the defendant, and most of the applicable law was not
even utilized, particularly the parts that prove beyond all
doubt that Mr. Palmer's property was and is a piece of
nonconforming land, with a nonconforming structure with a
nonconforming use, without a required front, side or rear
yard, or a required lot, and with every right in the world
to have access to satellite transmission signals under the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah, which is so
clearly pointed out in the Van Meter case supra, the Capital
Cities case, supra, and the Red Lion Case, Appendix "0" of
Appellant1s Brief on Appeal.

It is the right of the viewing

public that is paramount, not that of the broadcaster.

Not

even Congress can pass a law that abridges the rights of the
viewing public.

This material on the right of the defendant

to receive the signal and the lack of local jurisdiction to
interfere with the signal and the nonconforming land,
structure and use, should have been fully briefed by the
Attorney, who had the information in his possession for more
than four months before the July 5, 1988, jury trial.

The

defendant has been forced to defend himself against Salt
Lake City, the License Department, the Zoning Department,

the State of Utah, the circuit court, and the officers of
the courts, including his own defense counsel, because not a
single person involved in any of the above named offices,
institutions or departments will obey their oath of office
or the laws of the land.

An honest "judge" or person, or an

honest "attorney" who would obey his oath of office would
disqualify himself when he discovered his compensation and
bar fees were unconstitutional, unlawful, criminal and void.
Mr. Bybee specifically said to Mr. Palmer, "I believe you
are right, but I will not go to the wall with you and be
shot."

In other words, I will defend you even if you insist

on paying me in silver coin of standard regulated value,
when I obtained my license through use of fraudulent funds,
but I will only defend you to the point that I think it will
not cost me my fraudulently obtained license, and my access
to my fraudulently obtained legal fees.

Mr. Bybee was

willing enough to take the up front silver dollars, but he
was not willing to do what was ethically and morally right
to do to earn them in a case in which he said he believed
the defendant's position was Constitutionally, ethically,
morally, legally and in truth, correct.

He even discouraged

the defendant from making an appeal, and encouraged him to
remove the satellite antenna and apply for a variance,
instead of doing his homework, his legal research, getting
up on the subject he believed was at bar, and defending his
client who was willing to pay him for performance according

to the truth and the Constitutional law of the land, but who
was not willing to continue to pay him for nonperformance or
for wholly inadquate and substandard performance.
If Mr. Palmer had ask Mr. Bybee to appeal, how could he
trust him to file the required papers, or challenge the
jurisdiction of the trial court on appeal when he promised,
but failed, to file the original papers he was paid to write
and file on the same subject matter under the court order.
Mr. Hamp, the assistant city prosecutor, and counsel
for the respondent had first hand knowledge that Mr. Bybee
failed to file the brief or memorandum of law in support of
the motion to dismiss, and also that Mr. Bybee did not take
the matter to a federal court as was done in the Van Meter
case, supra, in order to get an injunction, as had been
suggested by Mr. Palmer to Mr Bybee the first day.

Attorney

Bybee did not use his legal expertise to defend his client,
but to the contrary, he neglected his duty to the truth, the
law and to his client.

All Mr. Palmer ever asked Mr. Bybee

to do for him was to defend him according to the truth and
according to the Constitutional law of the land.

Mr. Bybee

failed at both, and did not effectively assist Mr. Palmer in
his defense, but compromised with the prosecution and the
court even though he knew both of them were wrong, but he
had been a fellow prosecutor with the judge.

So Mr. Palmer

had three prosecutors working against his true defense
because his defense threatened their way of making a living.

Mr. Bybee never did know during the trial which type of
zoning district Mr. Palmer's property was located in and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate it to the court, and Mr.
Bybee kept asking Mr. Palmer about R-l, R-2, and R-3 zones,
and Mr. Palmer directly told him, Well you ask the wrong
question.

Mr Bybee allowed the judge to limit his questions

to R-l, R-2 and R-3, districts, when Mr. Palmer's property
is not in any one of them (TR 109).

The trial record

never established in which type of district Mr. Palmer's
property was located.

Nor was it ever established what the

specific size of a required front yard should have been in
the district in which Mr. Palmer's property was located.

It

was just assumed by the "judge and the jury" that Mr. Palmer
had a required front yard even though there was no evidence
before the court to that effect, except for Mr. Palmer's
testimony that he did not have a required front yard and
that the ordinance only applied to required front yards (TR
102).

The foundation was never laid to prove the verdict,

that the satellite antenna was in a "required front yard".
The time was not proved, the address was wrong, and the
property has no required front yard as defined in the code.
The verdict failed on all six essential elements and Mr.
Bybee did not even think he could win on appeal.
If Mr. Bybee had studied the court cases necessary for
writing the brief he would have known that state and local
zoning and other regulation that interferes with or operates
to prevent reception of satellite signals by home satellite

antennas users is preempted by U.S. law and that purported
laws operating to prevent reception are unconstitutional
and void from the outset. Van Meter, supra, Capitol Cities,
supra, Red Lion, supra, U.S.C.A. Amend. I, and Amend. 21.
Nothing could be more clear and obvious to anyone famililiar with this case and the relevant rules, Constitutional
provisions, laws, ordinances and regulations, Counsel was
clearly ineffective and the verdict was void fron the day
it was rendered for a multitude of reasons, including the
fact that the circuit court system is without a statutory
or constitutional basis for claiming jurisdiction, and
the fact that the city ordinance is preempted and void, and
the evidence does not support the verdict when viewed in a
light most favorable to the jury.

There is no question

that effective assistance of counsel would have brought
about a different result.

There is more than reasonable

grounds for reversal based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986).

The

decision of the Supreme Court in the Frame case is void for
failure of the "Senators", who unofficially confirmed the
justices, to subscribe and file their oaths of office for
the years 1975 through 1989, so Frame was also denied due
process of law, and his judges were falsely paid void money.
There is no evidence "Mr. Palmer" placed an "unauthorized structure" in a "required front yard" setback, on "his"
property at "933 East Pennsylvania Avenue", in Salt Lake
City, Utah, on or about January 6, 1988 at 11:20 a.m., nor
was evidence introduced to prove intent.

SLC Code 1.12.030

JURY INSTRUCTIONS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
There is no evidence, "That on or about January 6, 1988,
at 11:20 a.m., the defendant, Bruce Palmer, did place in his
yard at 933 East Pennsylvania Avenue, a satellite dish."
(TR 141)

There was no jury instruction given concerning SLC

Code 1.12.030.

Mr. Palmer does not own property at 933 East

Pennsylvania Avenue.
address.
Utah.

He has never owned property at that

There is no Pennsylvania Avenue in Salt Lake City,

A proper court would take judicial notice that there

is no Pennsylvania Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah.

See the

Metropolitan Street Guide in the Salt Lake City telephone
directory and the maps in the office of the County Recorder.
Both the Information and the Jury Instructions contained
Avenue, which is not true.

So, the prosecution, the "judge"

and the "jury" didn't pay attention to the true facts. A
true example of the blind leading the blind and the blind
instructing the blind and all of them, the prosecutor, the
judge and the jurors acting together in denying the truth
and falling into the pit they dug for their neighbor, all
because he understood and exercised his right to own and
operate a home satellite antenna on his own property.

The

city council, the mayor, the city prosecutor, the zoning
officers and the licensing officers, the "judge" and the
"jury" all tried to stop the defendant from exercising his
rights, denying themselves the same rights, and bringing the
state's legal system into disrepute, a natural consequence
of trying to govern outside the bounds of the United States
Constitution-the supreme law of the land, by city ordinance.

